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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1955, the City of Philadelphia first enacted a city ordi-
nance to preserve its historic structures.' At that time, Philadel-
phia was a pioneer for other cities in historic preservation
legislation. Eventually, however, the old ordinance became out-
moded, failing to keep up with the evolving jurisprudence of aes-
thetic regulation. By 1984, an overhaul of the ordinance was long
overdue. The update finally occurred in December of that year,
when the Council of the City of Philadelphia passed an ordinance
which repealed the existing ordinance and replaced it with new
legislation governing historic preservation in Philadelphia. 2
This article analyzes the new historic preservation ordinance.
It does so by first evaluating the evolution of the law of aesthetic
regulation and the ways in which changes in the law affected the
permissible bounds of historic preservation legislation. Second,
historic preservation legislation of other cities or municipalities in
the United States is reviewed. Finally, the new ordinance is evalu-
ated and compared with its legislative predecessor.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF LAND USE REGULATION
AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION LEGISLATION
There are three constitutional issues in historic preservation
legislation, as well as in other land use regulation: 1) what is a
proper public purpose under the police power, 2) what are suffi-
ciently definite standards to guide powers delegated to a govern-
mental entity, and 3) how is the regulation of property affected by
the substantive due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution. With respect to each issue, the
1. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007 (1955) (amended 1956) (repealed
1984).
2. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007 (1984).
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constitutional boundaries of land use regulation have expanded
in the last two decades. This expansion has prompted the intro-
duction of innovative land use controls, such as legislation which
seeks to protect historic resources, into the regulatory arsenal of
cities and municipalities.
A. Aesthetics as a Proper Public Purpose Under the Police Power
A municipality is not a sovereign and it has no independent
power to legislate.3 It may only enact legislation which is either
directly or indirectly authorized by the state in which it is lo-
cated. 4 The broad power of the states to regulate land use and
development is termed the "police power." 5 Typically, the police
power is delegated to municipalities by way of state enabling leg-
islation, which gives local government the power to enact legisla-
tion which furthers the health, safety and welfare of that
community. 6 Therefore, in analyzing the constitutionality of a
land use ordinance, one question which arises is whether the ordi-
nance furthers a proper public purpose. 7
The first land use ordinance upheld by the United States
Supreme Court against a constitutional challenge was that of the
City of Euclid, Ohio, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 8 The
3. Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 373, 200 A.2d 408, 412
(1964) (municipalities can enact only those ordinances which are authorized by
state legislature). For further discussion of this aspect of the Cleaver holding, see
infra note 65.
4. Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 373, 200 A.2d 408, 412
(1964); see also City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 179, 360 A.2d
607, 610 (1976) ("Municipalities derive their power to enact zoning ordinances
from specific grants by the Legislature."); Kline v. Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 447,
68 A.2d 182, 187 (1949) ("It is settled in Pennsylvania that in the absence of the
granting of specific power from the Legislature municipalities do not have the
authority to pass zoning ordinances.").
5. See Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 110, 141 A.2d 606,
609-10 (1958); see also Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 372, 200
A.2d 408, 412 (1964). In Cleaver, the police power was defined as follows:
"[T]he Supreme Power of Government ... to regulate or prohibit an owner's
use of his property provided such regulation or prohibition is clearly or reason-
ably necessary to preserve or protect the health or safety or morals and general
welfare of the people." Cleaver, 414 Pa. 367, 372, 200 A.2d 408, 412 (1964).
6. See Archbishop O'Hara's Appeal, 389 Pa. 35, 51-53, 131 A.2d 587, 595-
96 (1957); Kline v. Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 448-54, 68 A.2d 182, 187-89
(1949).
7. See Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 111-12, 141 A.2d 608,
610 (1958).
8. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In Euclid, an owner of unimproved land within the
corporate limits of the village brought suit to enjoin the village and its building
inspector from enforcing a zoning ordinance that excluded apartment houses
and hotels from residential areas. Id. at 390. The landowner claimed that the
19871 403
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Euclid Court reasoned that the power to zone was included in the
state police power, and further concluded that land use regula-
tion which furthers the health, safety and welfare of a community
is constitutionally valid. 9
Regulation of land use within a community is related to regu-
lation of the appearance of a community. Under Euclid, land use
regulation which furthers the health, safety or welfare of a com-
munity is valid, but courts have been reluctant to uphold ordi-
nances which regulate land uses based upon aesthetic factors.
One reason for the judicial caution is the view that the govern-
ment is an entity ill suited to oversee subjective decisions con-
cerning beauty or taste.10 Courts have conveyed the impression
that land use regulation based upon aesthetics is a luxury and that
only necessity can be the subject of valid land use regulation. I I
Modern land use regulation now incorporates the concept of
aesthetics as a fundamental element of community planning.
Aesthetic regulation was first approved by the United States
Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker.12 According to the author of
this landmark opinion, Justice Douglas:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive
... . The values it represents are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
ordinance was unconstitutional because it reduced the normal value of his prop-
erty and deprived him of liberty and property without due process of law. Id. at
371-72. The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as a valid exercise of the
state's police power. Id. at 396-97.
9. Although the Euclid Court did not expressly delineate the meaning of
"health, safety and general welfare," it pointed out that experts had found that
the segregation of residential, business, and industrial buildings will
make it easier to provide fire apparatus suitable for the character and
intensity of the development in each section; that it will increase the
safety and security of home life; greatly tend to prevent street acci-
dents, especially to children, by reducing the traffic and resulting con-
fusion in residential sections; decrease noise and other conditions
which produce or intensify nervous disorders; preserve a more
favorable environment in which to rear children, etc.
Id. at 394.
10. For a discussion of the problem of setting objective standards and crite-
ria in the field of aesthetic zoning, see generally Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic
Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 218, 226-27 (1955); Masotti
& Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46J. URBAN L. 773 (1969); Com-
ment, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 179
(1975).
11. See, e.g., City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654,
148 N.E. 842 (1925). For a discussion of aesthetic considerations, as well as
historic preservation generally, see P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS
(1986).
12. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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power of the legislature to determine that the commu-
nity should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled. 13
The trend in the law among the states is toward acceptance of the
concept that aesthetic considerations alone will justify the exer-
cise of the police power in land use regulation.' 4
At one time in Pennsylvania, aesthetics was not considered a
legitimate basis for the regulation of private property.' 5 Today,
Pennsylvania courts, compared to those of other jurisdictions,
continue to view aesthetic zoning with some hostility.' 6 While
aesthetics is accepted as a valid consideration in the enactment of
land use regulation, Pennsylvania courts insist that aesthetic con-
siderations alone cannot justify the invocation of the state's police
power. ' 7
The visually identifiable objective of legislation protecting
13. Id. at 33.
14. 3 P. ROHAN, supra note 11, at 16-211.
15. See, e.g., Miller v. Seaman, 137 Pa. Super. 24, 8 A.2d 415 (1939). In
Miller, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the dwelling at issue
may not harmonize or be in aesthetic agreement with [the buildings of
abutting owners] ... but zoning laws and regulations are not based on
aesthetics but on the health, morals and safety of the community, and
these are not affected by the proposed building. The limitation of the
right to use one's own property, which is one of the consequences of
zoning regulations must be reasonable and based on imperious consid-
erations of public health, morals and safety, not on artistic or aesthetic
considerations.
Id. at 31, 8 A.2d at 417.
16. 3 P. ROHAN, supra note 11, at 16-108.
17. Berk v. Wilkinsburg Zoning Hearing Bd., 48 Pa. Commw. 496, 410
A.2d 904 (1980); see also White Advertising Metro, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of
Susquehanna Township, 70 Pa. Commw. 308, 453 A.2d 29 (1982); Bux-Mont,
Inc. v. Township of Cheltenham, 36 Pa. Commw. 397, 388 A.2d 1106 (1978);
County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commw. 357, 315 A.2d 335 (1973). But see
Miller v. Seaman, 137 Pa. Super. 24, 8 A.2d 415 (1939). These recent cases
reflect the commonwealth court's refusal to accept the notion that aesthetics is a
valid basis for land use regulation, despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
pronouncement regarding article 1, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193,
311 A.2d 588 (1973), the court stated:
It must be recogized, however, that up until now, aesthetic or historical
considerations, by themselves, have not been considered sufficient to
constitute a basis for the Commonwealth's exercise of its police
power....
Now, for the first time, at least insofar as the state constitution is
concerned, the Commonwealth has been given power to act in areas of
purely aesthetic or historic concern.
Id. at 200-01, 311 A.2d at 592.
1987] 405
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historic structures, sites and districts is the promotion of aestheti-
cally pleasing architecture and neighborhoods. Yet, historic pres-
ervation also has desirable effects upon, inter alia, economic
growth, tourism and neighborhood vitality.' 8 Thus, historic pres-
ervation legislation often contains a statement of legislative pur-
pose which acknowledges that historic preservation advances the
public welfare beyond mere aesthetics.' 9 A determination by a
legislature of a particular jurisdiction that the preservation of his-
toric structures and areas furthers the public welfare is "well-nigh
conclusive." 20 Indeed, the Pennsylvania State Legislature has en-
acted legislation specifically authorizing local historic district
ordinances. 2'
B. Standards
A second constitutional issue concerning historic preserva-
tion legislation is the requirement of standards or criteria by
which governmental decisions affecting historic properties can be
made. Any legislation which delegates decision making authority
to a governmental entity must provide sufficiently clear standards
to govern the decision-making process. 22 Standards are intended
to curtail discretion in decision making by an administrative or
quasi-judicial entity, as prohibited by the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, 23 and thus to
18. K. LYNCH, GOOD CITy FORM 257-58 (1981).
19. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.1b (Purdon Supp. 1986); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 8002 (Purdon Supp. 1986); see also Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Therein, the United States Supreme
Court stated:
Because this Court has recognized, in a number of settings, that States
and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the
quality of life by preserving the characer and desirable aesthetic fea-
tures of a city .... appellants do not contest that New York City's objec-
tive of preserving structures and areas with special historic,
architectural, or cultural significance is an entirely permissible govern-
mental goal.
Id. at 129 (citations omitted).
20. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
21. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 8001-06 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1986). It
should be noted that this enabling legislation does not cover first class cities in
Pennsylvania. For the text of this legislation and a discussion of its omission of
first class cities, see infra note 288 and accompanying text. Philadelphia, as the
only first class city in Pennsylvania, is governed by the Home Rule Act. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13101-13157 (Purdon 1957 & Supp. 1986). For a discussion of
the effect of the 1984 historic preservation ordinance on the Home Rule Char-
ter, see infra notes 260-89 and accompanying text.
22. SeeJ.W. Hampton,Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
23. See Norate Corp., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 397, 403-
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avoid constitutional infirmity by an improper delegation .of legis-
lative power. 24
Standards are particularly important in the review of design
or aesthetic proposals. Criteria which set forth the factors upon
which design proposals will be judged protect landowners and
designers from arbitrary administrative decisions and lend gui-
dance to the governmental entity which must make those deci-
sions. Yet standards which entirely eliminate discretion on the
part of an administrative agency or commission are virtually im-
possible to formulate, since the review of design is by its nature
essentially a subjective process. 25
Many historic ordinances contain standards for both the
designation process and for the review of alteration or demolition
permits. 26 The omission of standards, however, may not invali-
date a historic preservation ordinance as long as sufficient safe-
guards against unfettered discretion on the part of the
governmental entity are included in the legislative structure of
the ordinance. 27 Nevertheless, tightly drafted criteria are desira-
04, 207 A.2d 890, 893-94 (1965); see also H.A. Steen Indus. Inc. v. Cavanaugh,
430 Pa. 10, 16, 241 A.2d 771, 775 (1968).
24. See 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 11, at 7-52.
25. See generally Dukeminier, supra note 10, at 20, 226-27 (1955). The au-
thor states:
Beauty cannot be any more precisely defined than wealth, property,
malice, or a host of multiordinal words to which courts are accustomed.
Planners can give reasons for saying a particular arrangement of objects
in the environment is beautiful based upon perspectives common in
high degree among the people in a community, but they cannot prove it
Id. (emphasis in original).
26. For a discussion of standards applied to designation and permit review,
see infra notes 131-32 & 142-46 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
The Maher court found:
While concerns of aesthetic or historical preservation do not admit
to precise quantification, certain firm steps have been undertaken here
to assure that the Commission would not be adrift to act without stan-
dards in an impermissible fashion. First, the Louisiana constitution, the
Vieux Carr6 Ordinance and, by interpretation, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, have specified their expectations for the Vieux Carr6 and the
values to be implemented by the legislation.
Further, the legislature exercises substantial control over the Com-
mission's decision making in several ways. Where possible, the ordi-
nance is precise, as for example in delineating the district, defining
what alterations in which locations require approval, and particularly
regulating items of special interest ....
Another method by which the lawmaking body curbed the possibil-
ity for abuse by the Commission was by specifying the composition of
that body and its manner of selection.
Id. at 1062 (footnotes omitted).
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ble in the enactment of a historic preservation ordinance. 28
C. The Substantive Due Process or "Taking" Issue
The gradual judicial acceptance of aesthetics in land use reg-
ulation has been accompanied by a judicial trend of reluctance to
find land use and historic preservation legislation to be "takings"
under the fourteenth amendment. 29 From the days of Penn-
sylvania Coal v. Mahon,30 the rule has been that "while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking."'3 ' Thus, owners of designated his-
toric structures who were denied opportunities to alter or demol-
ish and develop their properties complained that preservation
legislation amounted to a taking of their properties without com-
pensation. 32 However, it is now clear that courts will not find a
taking of property based solely on a decrease in property value
resulting from the enforcement of a land use ordinance. 33
Rather, the property must become virtually valueless as a result of
enforcing the regulation. 34
A landmark case involving "taking" jurisprudence in the con-
28. For a discussion of the constitutional importance of sufficiently defined
standards of criteria, see infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment provides in part:
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." Id.
30. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
31. Id. at 415. In Pennsylvaia Coal, the owner of land containing coal depos-
its deeded the surface to the Mahons, who assumed all risks and waived all rights
to damages which might arise as the result of the coal owner's continued mining.
Id. at 394-95. The state later enacted a statute forbidding mining in such a way
as to cause subsidence of any human habitation. Id. at 393-94. The Court held
that this prohibition exceeded the state's police power, because it deprived the
coal owner of his property in violation of the contract and due process clauses of
the Constitution. Id. at 414-16. But see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
32. See, e.g., Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm'n, 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d
163 (1976). In Figarsky, the owners of a house and lot located within the Nor-
wich historic district applied to the town's historic commission for a permit to
demolish the house. Id. at 199, 368 A.2d at 166. The commission denied the
application on the basis that the building contributed to the importance of the
area as an historic landmark. Id. at 201, 368 A.2d at 167. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the denial of the application. Id. at 212,
368 A.2d at 172. In response to plaintiffs' argument that the denial rendered
the ordinance creating the historic district confiscatory as to them, the court
stated that relief may be granted only when the regulation practically destroys or
greatly decreases the value of property. Id. at 211-12, 368 A.2d at 171.
33. See, e.g., id. at 211-12, 368 A.2d at 171.
34. See, e.g., id
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text of historic preservation legislation is Maher v. City of New Orle-
ans.3 5 In Maher, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found
that the application of historic district legislation governing the
Vieux Carr6 in New Orleans to plaintiff's property did not consti-
tute a taking.3 6  Plaintiff argued that his property had been
"taken" because the Vieux Carr Commission denied his applica-
tion for a permit to build an apartment complex on his land and
because the legislation imposed an affirmative duty to maintain
his property in good repair. 37 The court reasoned that police
power regulation is not invalid merely because it prevents achiev-
ing the maximum economic potential of property. 38 Rather, an
ordinance must be so "unduly onerous . . . as to be confisca-
tory." 39 The court concluded that plaintiff had failed to demon-
strate that "the ordinance so diminished the property value as to
leave Maher in effect, nothing."' 40 It further found that the affirm-
ative duty to maintain historic properties imposed by the ordi-
nance did not amount to a taking.4 '
Pennsylvania courts have adopted the test of Maher. For ex-
ample, in First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York, 4 2 a
church argued that enforcement of the historic ordinance was a
taking as applied to the "York House," a structure which it had
planned to raze.43 The commonwealth court concurred with the
trial court that the Maher test should be applied:
We agree . . . that the test to be applied is that of
whether the refusal of the permit to demolish went so far
as to preclude the use of York House for any purpose for
which it was reasonably adapted; and [the] conclusion
35. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
36. Id. at 1066-67.
37. Id. at 1054.
38. Id. at 1065.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1066 (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 1054.
42. 25 Pa. Commw. 154, 360 A.2d 257 (1976).
43. Id. at 157-58, 360 A.2d at 259. The ordinance protected certain histori-
cal areas by authorizing a Board of Historical Review to issue certificates on the
appropriateness of altering, demolishing, razing, etc., buildings located within
historic districts. Id. at 156-57, 360 A.2d at 258-59. The ordinance prohibited
obtaining a permit to make such changes without the certification of the Board.
Id. In determining that the ordinance did not result in a taking, the court ap-
plied the Pennsylvania common-law rule that a variance from the ordinance
could not be obtained on the mere showing that the property could be more
gainfully used or sold for a purpose not allowed by the ordinance. Id. at 162,
360 A.2d at 261.
1987] 409
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that the Church, having failed to show that a sale of the
property was impracticable, that commercial rental could
not provide a reasonable return or that other potential
uses of the property were foreclosed, had not carried its
burden of proving a taking without just compensation. 44
The denial of the demolition permit was thus upheld.45
The Maher test was also applied in Cleckner v. Harrisburg.46 In
Cleckner, a property owner unsuccessfully applied for a permit to
demolish two vacant houses which were located within the Harris-
burg historic district. 47 Plaintiff argued that the application of the
Harrisburg ordinance resulted in the taking of his property. 48 As
in Maher, the court in Cleckner distinguished between the denial of
the best use of property and the denial of all reasonable uses of
the property.49 It found that the landowner failed to show that he
could not sell the properties for their market values, and thus
failed to show that he was denied all reasonable uses for the
sites. 5
0
Maher antedated the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City. 5' Penn Central
involved a challenge to the application of New York City's
Landmarks Preservation Law to Grand Central Terminal. 52 The
terminal had been designated as a landmark, and appellants,
Penn Central and U.G.P. Properties, Inc., applied for a permit to
construct an office buiding in the air space over the terminal
44. Id. at 161-62, 360 A.2d at 261.
45. Id. at 162-63, 360 A.2d at 261.
46. 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 393 (1979).
47. Id. at 394-95.
48. Id. at 395-96. The court found that there were two facets to the "tak-
ing" argument: one concerned history and aesthetics, the other economics. Id.
With regard to the former aspect, the court concluded that demolition of the
buildings could be detrimental to the preservation of the fabric of the historic
district. Id. at 398. Regarding the economic issue, the court found that the test
for "taking" was not whether the ordinance denied plaintiff the best use of his
property. Id. at 400.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 400-01.
51. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
52. Id. at 115. New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law provided for
the formation of a historic commission to identify properties and areas of special
historical or aesthetic interest or value. Id. at 110. Furthermore, the commis-
sion had the authority to designate landmarks, landmark sites and historic dis-
tricts. 438 U.S. at 110-11. The ordinance imposed a duty on the owner of a
designated property to keep the exterior of the building in good repair. Id. at
111-12. Moreover, the law required the commission to approve any alterations
which the owner wished to make to the building. Id. at 112.
410 [Vol. 32: p. 401
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building.53 The New York Landmarks Commission denied appel-
lants' permit application, and appellants challenged both the
designation and the permit denial as a taking.54 The Court reaf-
firmed that a regulation which merely reduces the value of prop-
erty is not a taking: "The submission that appellants may
establish a 'taking' simply by showing that they have been denied
the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had
believed was available for development is quite simply
untenable." 55
The Court applied the reasoning in Maher regarding the stan-
dard for a taking to New York City's landmarks legislation, which
singled out historic buildings for preservation.56 The Penn Central
Court suggested that even where an ordinance singles out indi-
vidual landowners, a dimunition in the value of property alone
will not establish a taking.57
Both Maher and Penn Central signify the expansion of constitu-
tional jurisprudence on the taking issue as it is applied to historic
preservation ordinances. As long as some value is left to property
governed by a historic preservation ordinance, there is no taking
of property. Some historic preservation ordinances include eco-
nomic hardship as a consideration in the permit application
process and, thus, have provided more protection from adminis-
trative decisions than the Constitution, as interpreted in Penn
Central.58
III. HISTORIC PRESERVATION LEGISLATION
Legislation designed to protect and preserve historic struc-
tures, sites and districts is a relatively recent addition to the land
use regulatory structure of many communities. Much of the his-
toric preservation legislation in effect today was enacted in the
1960's and 1970's. 59 Philadelphia's old ordinance attempted to
protect urban historic resources, 60 and was written without the
53. 438 U.S. at 115-16.
54. Id. at 116.
55. Id. at 130.
56. Id. at 131.
57. Id.
58. The new Philadelphia historic preservation ordinance includes hardship
as a factor to be considered when not contrary to the public interest. PHILADEL-
PHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(7)(k)(.7).
59. For the dates of enactment of the ordinances surveyed for this study,
see infra note 63.
60. Philadelphia's first historic preservation ordinance was enacted in 1955.
PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007 (1955).
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benefit of the jurisprudence of substantive due process and aes-
thetic regulation that later evolved.
The framework of most historic preservation legislation is es-
sentially similar: Certain historic sites, structures or districts are
designated as historically significant, and a quasi-judicial entity6'
gives heightened scrutiny to applications to alter or demolish
those designated structures or structures within a designated dis-
trict. 62 Beyond this basic framework, however, great variation ex-
ists among the ordinances of different cities. 63
One reason for the variation among the local ordinances is
the varied content of state historic preservation enabling legisla-
tion.64 While most states have enacted enabling legislation au-
thorizing local historic regulation, some states have not.65 Local
preservation legislation may only govern that which the state en-
61. Usually, such a quasi-judicial entity is a historic commission, the mem-
bership of which is selected for its expertise or interest in historic architecture.
For a discussion of the composition and appointment of historic commissions,
see infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
62. Some ordinances authorize their town planning commissions to review
applications for permits to alter or demolish designated historic sites. For exam-
ples of ordinances providing for such reviews by planning commissions, see infra
note 73 and accompanying text.
63. Information regarding the substance and structure of historic preserva-
tion legislation was derived from the following ordinances: ALBANY, N.Y., CITY
CODE div. 4, ch. 1 (1966); ALEXANDRIA, VA., CrrY CODE §§ 7-6-221 to 238, 251 to
268 (1963); ANNAPOLIS, MD., CITY CODE art. XI, §§ 22-226 to 245 (1969)
(amended 1985); BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. I, § 40 (1966); BOISE, IDAHO,
ORDINANCE 4443, ch. 18 (Sept. 4 1979); 1975 Boston, Mass. Acts ch. 772 (Dec.
16, 1975) (amended 1982); BURLINGTON, VT., CODE, App. A-Zoning, §§ 1-88
(1980); CHARLESTON, S.C., CrIv CODE art. 3, §§ 54-23 to 35 (1966) (amended
1973, 1975, and 1979); CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 21, §§ 21-62 to 64.2(1957) (amended 1968); DALLAS, TEX., Crrv CODE §§ 51-3.103, 4.501 (1981);
Washington, D.C. Law 2-144 (Dec. 27, 1978); Dover, Del., Historic District Or-
dinance §§ 3, 21; MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch. 34, §§ 34.10-.90 (1960); New
Orleans, La. Ordinances 5992 (Feb. 19, 1976) (revised Aug. 21, 1980), 6699
(Feb. 23, 1978) (revised May 7, 1981); NEW YORE, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 2004
(1965); NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1965);
PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 513 (1985); PORTLAND, OR., MUNICI-
PAL CODE tit. 33, ch. 33.120 (1975); PORTSMOUTH, N.H., ZONING ORDINANCE art.
X, §§ 10-1001 to 1008; St. Louis, Mo. Ordinance 57986 (Feb. 1, 1980); SAVAN-
NAH, GA., HISTORIC DISTRICT ZONING ORDINANCE § 8-3029 (Dec. 1972); SEAT-
TLE, WASH. ORDINANCE 106348 (Apr. 4, 1977); TRENTON, NJ. ORDINANCE 72-43.
64. See NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, RECOMMENDED
MODEL PROVISIONS FOR A PRESERVATION ORDINANCE 1 (1980) (proposing uni-
form preservation legislation); see generally, 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 11, at 7-21 to
7-30.
65. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania enabling legislation, see supra note
20 and accompanying text. Some cities have relied upon the powers delegated
by the state through general zoning enabling legislation to enact historic preser-
vation ordinances. See 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 11, at 7-28.
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abling legislation has authorized it to govern. 66 In addition,
home rule legislation may be enacted by states for large cities,
which empowers city to delineate through its city charter the per-
missible bounds of legislation, subject, of course, to constitu-
tional limits. 67 Because there is considerable variation among the
enabling acts and city charters, there are variations among the
many ordinances. The following sections analyze the variations
among a selected group of ordinances.
A. Scope of the Ordinances
The types of historic resources which historic preservation
legislation seeks to protect varies considerably among the ordi-
nances. Some ordinances govern only historic districts which
have been so designated by the town legislature at the same time
as passage of the ordinance. 68  Other ordinances protect
landmarks (i.e. individual buildings, structures, etc.) as well as his-
toric districts. 69 The ordinances for some localities authorize the
designation and review of historic objects, improvements and
66. See Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964).
Therein, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
Municipalities are not sovereigns; they have no original or fundamental
power of legislation; a municipal or councilmanic body can enact only
the ordinances and exercise only the zoning powers which are author-
ized by the Legislature, and the Legislature can delegate or grant only
those legislative and zoning powers which are Constitutionally
permitted.
Id. at 373, 200 A.2d at 412 (citations omitted). Enabling legislation, however, is
to be liberally construed. See, e.g., Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 425 Pa. 43, 49, 228 A.2d 169, 174 (1967); Commonwealth v. Ashenfelder,
413 Pa. 517, 520, 198 A.2d 514, 515 (1964).
67. The Pennsylvania Legislature authorized home rule through city char-
ter for Philadelphia, its only first class city. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13101 (Pur-
don 1957). The authorization for zoning regulation and enforcement for first
class cities is PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 14751 (Purdon 1957). This statute states
in part that "[for the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, order, and
general welfare, cities of the first class may regulate the location, size, and use of
buildings therein, and may make different regulations for different districts
thereof." Id. For a discussion of the concept of home rule, see generally Com-
ment, Home Rule in Pennsylvania, 81 DICK. L. REV. 265 (1977).
68. See, e.g., ANNAPOLIS, MD., CITY CODE art. XI, § 22-227 (1969); CHARLES-
TON, S.C., CITY CODE art. 3, § 54-24 (1966) (amended 1973); DOVER, DEL., His-
TORIC DISTRICT ORDINANCE § 21; PORTSMOUTH, N.H., ZONING ORDINANCE art. X,
§ 10-1001; SAVANNAH, GA., HISTORIC DISTRICT ZONING ORDINANCE § 8-3029(b)
(Dec. 1972).
In Pennsylvania, the Historic Districts Enabling Act authorizes the establish-
ment of historic districts only in other than cities of the first class. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 8002 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1986).
69. See, e.g., DALLAS, TEX., CITY CODE § 51-4.501(a)(1) (1981); District of
Columbia Law 2-144 §§ 3(e)-(f) (Dec. 27, 1978); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§ 207-2.0 (1965).
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sites,70 or areas, places, buildings, structures, works of art and
other objects of special historic, community or aesthetic inter-
est. 7 ' Still other ordinances govern interior landmarks. 72
B. Historic Commissions
Historic preservation legislation universally provides for
heightened scrutiny in the review of applications for alteration or
demolition permits for designated properties. A historic commis-
sion with specialized expertise or interest in historic preservation
generally performs the review of these applications. Most historic
preservation legislation expressly authorizes or mandates the es-
tablishment of a historic commission. A few ordinances provide
that the town planning commission shall be the entity to review
permit applications for historic districts or structures. 73
The composition and manner of appointment of the historic
commission is an important consideration in historic preservation
legislation, since it is presumably desirable to insulate decisions
regarding the preservation of structures from political influences.
Thus, while some ordinances authorize the mayor to appoint the
historic commission,74 other ordinances require city council ap-
proval of appointees75 or mandate that appointments be chosen
from nominees selected by special interest groups or professional
associations. 76 In addition, many ordinances require some ap-
70. See, e.g., Seattle, Wash. Ordinance 106348 § 1.02 (April 4, 1977).
71. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 21, § 21-64(b) (1957)
(amended 1968).
72. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-2.0 (1965); PORT-
LAND, OR., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 33, § 33.120.50(e) (1975); TRENTON, N.J., ORDI-
NANCE 72-43 § 2-22.5(B).
73. See, e.g., BURLINGTON, VT., CODE, App. A-Zoning, § 18(A)(1) (1980);
DOVER, DEL., HISTORIC DISTRICT ORDINANCE §§ 3.1, 21.3.
74. See, e.g., ALBANY, N.Y., CITY CODE div. 4, ch. 1 § 3(a) (1966); CHICAGO,
ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 21, § 21-62 (1957) (amended 1968).
75. See, e.g., Washington, D.C. Law 2-144 § 4(a) (Dec. 27, 1978); New Orle-
ans, La., Ordinances 5992 § 2 (Feb. 19, 1975) (revised Aug. 21, 1980), 6699 § 2(Feb. 23, 1978) (revised May 7, 1981); PITrSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES
§ 513.5(a) (1985); Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 106348 § 2.01(b) (April 4, 1977).
76. See, e.g., BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 1 § 40(c)(l) (1966); 1976 Bos-
ton, Mass. Acts ch. 772, § 3 (Dec. 16, 1975) (amended 1982); DALLAS, TEX., CITY
CODE § 51-3.103 (1981); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch. 34, § 34.10 (1960).
The Baltimore ordinance is illustrative. It provides:
The Commission shall consist of eleven members to be appointed by
the Mayor as follows: One to be chosen from a list of two nominated by
the Board of Trustees of the Baltimore Museum of Art; one from a list
of two nominated by the Board of Trustees of the Municipal Museum
of Baltimore; one from a list of two nominated by the Board of Trust-
ees of the Walters Art Gallery; one from a list of two nominated by the
414 [Vol. 32: p. 401
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pointees to have professional experience in some facet of historic
preservation. 77
There is clearly a need to isolate historic preservation from
political pressure. Some municipalities have also deemed it im-
portant to have community representation on their historic com-
missions. Residency is, therefore, a requirement for appointment
to the historic commissions of some communities. 78 Moreover,
the two New Orleans ordinances require that one resident or
property owner from each historic district be appointed to the re-
spective historic commissions. 79 Other ordinances require exper-
tise in a profession or academic field related to historic
preservation. 0
C. Powers and Duties of the Historic Commissions
A local legislative body cannot delegate to a historic commis-
sion powers that it does not have. The role of a given historic
commission will be, therefore, limited by the political philosophy
and imagination of the drafters of the ordinance in question as
well as the applicable state enabling legislation. It follows that
Council of the Maryland Historical Society; one to be a member of the
Baltimore City Council nominated by the President of that body ....
BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE § 40(c)(1). The ordinance goes on to require that
membership appointments be experienced in professional fields. For a discus-
sion of ordinances which require professional experience in the field of historic
preservation, see infra note 77.
77. See, e.g., 1975 Boston, Mass. Acts ch. 772, § 3 (Dec. 16, 1975) (amended
1982); CHARLESTON, S.C. CITY CODE art. 3, § 54-26 (1966) (amended 1979);
NEW YORK, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 2004 (1965); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDI-
NANCES § 513.5(a) (1985); St. Louis, Mo. Ordinance 57986, 24.08.010 (Feb. 1,
1980); SEATrLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 106348, § 2.01(a) (Apr. 4, 1977). There are
many variations as to professional requirements. The Seattle ordinance pro-
vides one example:
The membership of the [Landmarks Preservation] Board shall consist
of at least two architects, (one of whom may be a landscape architect),
two historians, one representative from the City Planning Commission,
one structural engineer, one representative from the field of real estate
management, and one representative from the field of finance. Three
additional members shall also be appointed without regard to occupa-
tion or affiliation. All Board members shall have a demonstrated sym-
pathy with the purposes of this Ordinance.
Id.
78. See, e.g., ANNAPOLIS, MD., CITY CODE art. XI, § 22-230 (1969) (amended
1985).
79. See, e.g., New Orleans, La. Ordinances 5992 § 2 (Feb. 19, 1976) (revised
Aug. 21, 1980), 6699 § 2 (Feb. 23, 1978) (revised May 7, 1981). There are two
historic commissions for New Orleans: 1) the Central Business District Historic
District Landmarks Commission (Ordinance 6699) and 2) the New Orleans His-
toric District/Landmarks Commission (Ordinance 5992). Id.
80. See, e.g., PORTLAND, OR., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 33, § 33.120.020 (1975).
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there is considerable variation in the powers and duties of differ-
ent historic commissions.
Some commissions are extremely limited in their role in city
government. Their only task is to review and to recommend the
approval or denial of applications for permits to alter or demolish
designated structures or structures in designated historic dis-
tricts.8 1 In some instances, a permit to alter or demolish may be
issued by the appropriate building authority even after the his-
toric commission has recommended against issuance of the per-
mit.8 2 With this type of limited role, the ability of the historic
commission to implement preservation goals would depend upon
the desire of other city governing entities to accept the recom-
mendations of the historic commission.
On the other hand, the powers and duties of historic commis-
sions can be quite broad. In some communities, the historic com-
mission not only reviews but also decides applications for
demolition or alteration. If the historic commisson disapproves
the permit application, no permit may be issued, 83 subject, of
course, to judicial review of the commission's decision.
Most historic commissions have no independent power to
designate historic buildings or structures. 84 Some commissions
81. See, e.g., ALBANY, N.Y., CiTY CODE div. 4, ch. 1, § 6 (1966).
82. See, e.g., id.; CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 21, § 21-64.1(). The
Chicago ordinance expressly provides that "[n]o decision of the commission dis-
approving an application for permit to construct, reconstruct, alter, add to, or
demolish property designated a 'Chicago Landmark' shall be deemed by the ap-
plicant for permit as a denial thereof." Id.
83. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch. 34, § 34.60(d) (1960) ("If the
commission shall have disapproved the plans, the director of inspections shall
not issue such permit."); St. Louis, Mo. Ordinance 57986, § 24.12.190 (Feb. 1,
1980) ("No permit... shall be issued by the building commissioner unless the
heritage commissioner shall have determined that the proposed work complies
with the applicable historic district standards, or the commission or heritage
commissioner has recommended that the application for permit be approved.");
SAVANNAH, GA., HISTORIC DISTRICT ZONING ORDINANCE § 8-3029(g) (Dec. 1972)
("If the Board of Review disapproves the application, a certificate of appropri-
ateness shall not be issued. The Board shall state its reasons in writing, and the
zoning administrator shall advise the applicant and a permit shall not be
issued.").
84. The ordinance of the District of Columbia was the only ordinance sur-
veyed which gives the historic commission the power to designate buildings or
districts without ratification by a separate government entity. That ordinance
provides that the Historic Preservation Review Board shall "designate and main-
tain a current inventory of historic landmarks and historic districts in the District
of Columbia and, in connection therewith, adopt and publish appropriate proce-
dures ...... Washington, D.C. Law 2-144, § 4(c)(3) (Dec. 27, 1978). For a
detailed discussion of designation procedures, see infra notes 110-30 and ac-
companying text.
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may designate landmarks or districts subject to ratification by an-
other government entity.8 5 Other historic commissions study and
review prospective designations, and prepare ordinances
designating structures or districts for passage by the city legisla-
ture.8 6 Finally, some ordinances merely authorize the city historic
commission to recommend designations for eventual action by
the local legislature.8 7
The powers of a historic commission may extend beyond its
review of applications for alteration and demolition permits and
its role in the designation process. Some ordinances have broad,
generic provisions which empower their commissions to act in
furtherance of the spirit of the historic preservation ordinance.88
Of course, the delegation of such broad powers may be subject to
constitutional challenge unless specific standards accompany such
powers to govern their use.8 9
Other powers and duties of historic commissions may be
loosely categorized as "discretionary powers." In some ordi-
nances, the local historic commission is charged with the duty of
conducting studies of historic preservation for that community. 90
Some ordinances include the duty of preparing historic surveys or
of making lists of historically significant structures. 9 1 Other local-
85. See, e.g., New Orleans, La., Ordinances 5992 § X(A)(10), (13) (Feb. 19,
1976) (revised Aug. 21, 1980); 6699 § X(A)(6), (10) (Feb. 23, 1978) (revised
May 7, 1981); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 207-2.0(b), (g)(2) (1965).
86. See, e.g., St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 57986, §§ 24.12.020, .130 (Feb. 1,
1980); BOISE, IDAHO, ORDINANCE 4443, ch. 18, § 2-18-7(d) (Sept. 4, 1979).
87. See, e.g., PITrSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 513.3(a)(3) (1985).
88. See, e.g., ALBANY, N.Y., CITY CODE div. 4, ch. 1, § 2 (1966). The Albany
ordinance provides:
It is the intent of this ordinance that the Historic Sites Commission
carry out the following purposes in the best interest of the City of
Albany.
a. To protect, preserve and enhance those places, buildings,
structures and objects which are of special character or interest to the
City of Albany.
b. To foster civic beauty.
c. To safeguard and preserve the historical, cultural and architec-
tural heritage of the City of Albany.
Id.
89. For a discussion of the necessity for using specific standards for govern-
mental entities in making land use regulation decisions, see supra notes 22-28
and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., 1975 Boston, Mass. Acts ch. 772, § 11 (Dec. 16, 1975)(amended 1982); St. Louis, Mo. Ordinance 57986, § 24.08.030(c) (Feb. 1,
1980).
91. See, e.g., BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 1 § 40(K), (M) (1966); BOISE,
IDAHO, ORDINANCE 4443, ch. 18, § 2-18-5(A) (Sept. 4, 1979); PORTLAND, OR.,
MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 33, § 33.120.040(i) (1975). Lists of this nature should not
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ities entrust to the historic commission the responsibility for pro-
moting community education in historic preservation, 92 or
articulating a community policy regarding preservation.93
Historic commissions in many communities have been em-
powered to establish historic preservation programs. Some ordi-
nances authorize historic commissions to prepare historic
preservation plans. 9 4 Baltimore, Maryland's ordinance empowers
its commission to develop incentive programs for preservation,95
and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania's ordinance authorizes its commis-
sion to facilitate redevelopment. 96 The Portland, Oregon pres-
ervation ordinance requires its historic commission to keep
a pictorial history of historic buildings which have been
destroyed. 97
Other powers given to historic commissions include the ac-
quistion of interests in property to further the objective of his-
toric preservation. In this regard, some ordinances go as far as to
authorize their historic commissions to acquire and restore build-
ings. 98 More restrictive ordinances grant only the authority to rec-
ommend the acquisition of interests in property99 or the lease,
sale, or transfer of property. i00 Some ordinances allow the com-
mission to contract for and accept grants or gifts,' 0 ' while others
be confused with designating property. Designation is the process by which a
structure is determined to be significant and officially proclaimed a historic
structure. Designation requires heightened review through the permitting pro-
cess. A list is a compilation of historically important places, or an inventory of
the historic resources of a municipality.
92. See, e.g., BOISE, IDAHO, ORDINANCE 4443, ch. 18, § 2-18-5(I) (Sept. 4,
1979); PITrSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 513.5(b)(5) (1985).
93. See, e.g., St. Louis, Mo. Ordinance 57986, § 24.08.030(A) (Feb. 1, 1980).
94. See, e.g., DALLAS, TEX., CITY CODE § 51-3.103(c)(2) (1981); PITTSBURGH,
PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 513.3(b)(1l) (1985).
95. BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. I, § 40(t) (1966).
96. PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 513.5(b)(8) (1985). The ordi-
nance imposes upon the historic commission the responsibility of "facilitat[ing]
the redevelopment of historic structures and districts in accordance with ap-
proved development plans of the city." Id.
97. PORTLAND, OR., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 33, §§ 33.120.100(a), .040(g)
(1975).
98. See, e.g., BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. I § 40(5) (1966). The Boston
ordinance requires consent of the mayor and council prior to acquisition. 1975
Boston, Mass. Acts ch. 772, § 11 (Dec. 16, 1975) (amended 1982).
99. See, e.g., BOISE, IDAHO, ORDINANCE 4443, ch. 18, § 2-18-5(B) (Sept. 4,
1979); DALLAS, TEX., CITY CODE § 51-3.103(c)(4) (1981).
100. See, e.g., BOISE, IDAHO, ORDINANCE 4443, ch. 18, § 2-18-5(D) (Sept. 4,
1979).
101. See, e.g., BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. I, § 40(S) (1966); Boston,
Mass. Acts ch. 772, § 11 (Dec. 16, 1975) (amended 1982); St. Louis, Mo. Ordi-
nance 57986, § 24.08.050 (Feb. 1, 1980).
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authorize the commission to solicit funding. 102 The Portland, Or-
egon ordinance directs that its commission may obtain and keep
historical artifacts. 103
Many ordinances give historic commissions the power to en-
force their provisions, which may differ from the duty to enforce a
preservation ordinance. In Charleston, South Carolina, the
Board of Architectural Review may file a petition with the Public
Safety and Housing Officer to require the repair of historic struc-
tures.' 0 4 Baltimore, Maryland empowers its Historical and Archi-
tectural Commission to apply to the court for an injunction
preventing the demolition or alteration of a designated struc-
ture.10 5  The Trenton, New Jersey ordinance gives to its
Landmarks Commission for Historic Preservation the duty of su-
pervising the "ordinary maintenance and repairs" of designated
structures. 10 6 Many ordinances authorize commissions to pre-
pare "use guidelines" for designated historic structures or struc-
tures within designated historic districts. 10 7
In several instances, local legislatures have expressly dele-
gated to their historic commissions the responsibility for interact-
ing with other bodies in the local government. These duties
range from keeping the mayor informed of historic preservation
activities' 0 8 to acting as liaison between government branches. 10 9
102. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch. 34, § 34.40(d) (1960).
103. PORTLAND, OR., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 33, § 33.120.100 (1975).
104. CHARLESTON, S.C. CITY CODE, App. A-Zoning, art. 3, § 54-32 (1966)
(amended 1973).
105. BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE § 40(v) (1966). That provision reads:
The Baltimore City Court, upon application of the Commission,
may restrain and/or enjoin the excavation, construction or erection, re-
construction, alteration, removal of any exterior architectural feature,
change in exterior color, or demolition of any buildings or structures,
now or hereafter in an Historical and Architectural Preservation Dis-
trict, or to any building on the Landmark List or on the Special List, in
violation of such section and order the removal of any such exterior
architectural feature constructed or reconstructed in violation thereof,
and the substantial restoration of any such exterior architectural fea-
ture altered or demolished in violation thereof or the exterior color of
which is changed in violation thereof.
Id.
106. TRENTON, N.J., ORDINANCE 72-43, § 2-22(A)(b).
107. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch. 34, § 34.40(e) (1960); PITTS-
BURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 513.5(b)(3) (1985); PORTLAND, OR., MUNICI-
PAL CODE tit. 33, § 33.120.040(K) (1975).
108. See, e.g., Washington, D.C. Law 2-144, § 4(c)(1) (Dec. 27, 1978); St.
Louis, Mo. Ordinance 57986, § 24.08.030 (Feb. 1, 1980). The St. Louis ordi-
nance provides for its commission to keep all government branches and private
entities informed. Id.
109. See, e.g., PITrSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 513.5(b)(9) (1985).
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D. Designation of Landmarks or Districts
Any attempt to protect historic resources must be accompa-
nied by a method to single out the resources worthy of preserva-
tion. As might be expected, great variety exists in the ways in
which structures and areas may be designated as historically
significant.
In jurisdictions in which both historic districts and structures
are protected, a different method may be employed to designate
landmarks or individual historic structures from that employed to
designate a historic district.'' 0 It is likely that the separate
designation process is used because the designation of a historic
district is viewed as a greater imposition of government regula-
tion, affecting a broader segment of the population. Thus, the
procedural safeguards used for the designation of historic dis-
tricts are often somewhat stricter than those used for individual
structures.
In some communities, the local legislature alone is capable of
designating structures, landmarks or historic districts for preser-
vation."1 ' It is usually the case for such "legislative designations"
that at least some city landmarks or historic districts were desig-
nated at the same time as the city historic preservation ordinance
was enacted-perhaps in the same or a companion bill. 1 2 In a
legislative designation, the city legislature must follow the same
procedural safeguards as it would to enact or amend its zoning
ordinance or other legislation, including notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard by citizens.
Most ordinances reviewed, however, require joint effort be-
tween the local legislature and the historic commission in the
designation process. Using this method, a locality may combine
the specialized knowledge of the historic commission with the
procedural safeguards of designation through the legislature.
Ordinances using this approach usually direct that the local his-
toric commission investigate important historic structures and
110. See, e.g., PORTLAND, OR., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 33, §§ 33.120.050, .055,
.060 (1975); St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 57986, § 24.12.060, .250 (Feb. 1, 1980).
111. See, e.g., ALBANY, N.Y., CITY CODE div. 4, ch. 1 (1966); CHARLESTON,
S.C., CITY CODE art. 3, §§ 54-23, -24 (1966) (amended 1973); Dover, Del., His-
toric District Ordinance § 21; SAVANNAH, GA., HISTORIC DISTRICT ZONING ORDI-
NANCE § 8-3029 (Dec. 1972); see also ALEXANDRIA, VA., CITY CODE §§ 7-6-22 1, -
251 (1963). The Alexandria ordinance legislatively designates landmarks and
districts. In designating landmarks, the ordinance oddly calls for the advice of
many administrative entities, but not the historic commission. ALEXANDRIA, VA.,
CITY CODE §§ 7-6-253,-255 (1963).
112. See, e.g., ALEXANDRIA, VA., CITY CODE §§ 7-6-221 to 238, 251 to 268.
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compile a list of buildings with the potential for historic designa-
tion. After public hearings, and possibly after the advice of other
city agencies, the structures or districts are sent to the local legis-
lature for designation approval." 13
The St. Louis, Missouri ordinance exemplifies this common
commission/legislative designation procedure." 4 Historic dis-
trict designation is begun by a petition by a member of the com-
mission or by the alderman for the ward in which the proposed
district is located. 1 5 The petition includes a map and a legal de-
scription of the proposed district, a statement of historic signifi-
cance and economic condition, a plat, a general plan, proposed
historic standards and a statement of necessary zoning amend-
ments. 116 The petition is then forwarded within five days to the
St. Louis Community Development Agency, Arts and Humanities
Commission, and to the Board of Public Service." 17 Within forty-
five days after receipt, these agencies must make recommenda-
tions on the proposed designation." 8 Within ninety days of fil-
ing, a public hearing is held." 9 Within fifteen days prior to the
hearing, written notice must be sent to the landowners affected' 20
and published in two daily newspapers.' 21 Within ten days of the
hearing, a placard reading "Proposed Historic District In This
Block" must be posted in the proposed historic district.' 22 The
ordinance prescribes that an opportunity to be heard shall be af-
forded to all interested parties at the public hearing. 23 The St.
Louis Historic Commission must, within sixty days of the hear-
ing, 124 make a determination regarding designation. A designa-
113. See, e.g., BOISE, IDAHO, ORDINANCE 4443 ch. 18, §§ 2-18-7, -8 (Sept. 4,
1979); CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 21, § 21-64 (1957) (amended 1968);
PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 513.3 (1985); PORTLAND, OR., MUNICI-
PAL CODE tit. 33, §§ 33.120.050, .055, .060 (1975).
114. St. Louis, Mo. Ordinance 57986, § 24.12.070 (Feb. 1, 1980).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. § 24.12.080(A).
118. Id. § 23.12.080(B).
119. Id. § 24.12.090.
120. Id. § 24.12.100(B). The ordinance actually calls for written notice
"[t]o the extent practicable," and authorizes reliance upon the current city tax
lists or other city lists. Id.
121. Id. § 24.12.100(A).
122. Id.
123. Id. § 24.12.110. Unfortunately, the ordinance does not define "inter-
ested parties." Thus, it is assumed by the author that "interested parties" refers
to people interested in the outcome of the hearing, rather than those with an
interest recognized at law.
124. Id. § 24.12.120.
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tion bill is then prepared by the Historic Commission.125 The bill
will not reach a final vote until a second public hearing has been
held, with notice in two daily newspapers and a placard posted in
the proposed district.' 26 The designation bill is then sent to the
Board of Aldermen for passage. 127
The method for designation of a landmark in St. Louis is sim-
ilar to that for designation of a district. A petition for landmark
designation, however, may be commenced by a landowner. 28 In
addition, it is within the discretion of the Historic Commission as
to whether an initial public hearing on designation will be held. 129
A public hearing is still held by the Board of Aldermen before
passage of the ordinance designating the landmark. 30
The St. Louis ordinance also contains criteria for designa-
tion.'13 While it is difficult to draft standards to ensure that his-
toric properties of significance will be identified, it is nonetheless
important to establish at least some standards to prevent arbitrary
designations. Specific standards are most important for ordi-
nances which delegate to the commission a great deal of discre-
tion in the designation process. 3 2
E. Commission Review of Applications for Demolition or Alteration
The purpose of historic legislation is to prevent demolitions
125. Id. § 24.12.130.
126. Id. § 24.12.150.
127. Id. § 24.12.160.
128. Id. § 24.12.260.
129. Id. § 24.12.280.
130. Id. § 24.12.320.
131. Id. § 24.12.010. That section provides:
An area, site or improvement may be designated for preservation
as an historic district or as a landmark and/or landmark site if it:
A. Has significant character or value as part of the development, heri-
tage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation; or
B. Is the site of a significant historic event; or
C. Is the work of a master whose individual work has significantly in-
fluenced the development of the city, state or nation; or
D. Conatins elements of design, detail, materials or craftsmanship
which represent a significant innovation; or
E. Owning to its unique location or singular physical characteristic
represents an established and familiar visual feature of a neighbor-
hood, community or the city; or
F. Has yielded, or is likely to yield, according to the best available
scholarship, archaeological artifacts important in prehistory or
history.
Id.
132. For a discussion of the necessity for using specific standards when
making land use regulation decisions, see supra notes 22-28 and accompanying
text.
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and unsuitable alterations of structures which hold historic im-
portance to a community. This purpose is effectuated by review-
ing with heightened scrutiny, applications for permits to demolish
or alter stuctures. Theoretically, the commission, with its knowl-
edge of and interest in historic preservation, reviews each applica-
tion with greater sympathy to historic architecture than would the
municipal building department reviewing building permit
applications. i33
The procedure employed by municipalities to review historic
permit applications varies from community to community. Yet,
almost all towns surveyed require that the historic commission
either actually approve the permit itself or, after review, issue a
certificate of appropriateness which is a prerequisite to obtaining
a permit to alter or amend. 134 Some ordinances give the commis-
sion only the power to delay granting the demolition or alteration
permits.13 5 Most ordinances contain provisions concerning ap-
peals from commission decisions. Appeals are heard by a range
of public bodies, from city councils to the courts. 136
The due process and equal protection guarantees of the
United States Constitution require that notice and some kind of
hearing be provided 13 7 before a state or federal government may
deprive an individual of property.1 38 To comply with this consti-
tutional mandate, some ordinances prescribe the level of no-
133. For a review of the various requirements for the composition and
manner of appointment of members of historic commissions, see supra notes 73-
80 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., CHARLESTON, S.C., CITY CODE art. 3, § 54-25 (1966); CHI-
CAGO, ILL., MUNNICIPAL CODE ch. 21, § 21-62.1(a)-(g) (1957) (amended 1966);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch. 34, § 34.60 (1960); SAVANNAH, GA., HISTORIC
DISTRICT ZONING ORDINANCE § 8-3029(e)(g) (Dec. 1972).
135. E.g., TRENTON, NJ., ORDINANCE 72-43 § 11.
136. See, e.g., ANNAPOLIS, MD., CITY CODE art. II, § 22-236 (1969) (amended
1985) (direct appeal to court); PORTLAND, OR., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 33,
§ 33.120.080(e) (1975) (city council); PORTSMOUTH, N.H., ZONING ORDINANCE
art. X, § 10-1008 (Board of Adjustment). A significant question remaining is
whether any "aggrieved person" has the standing to appeal a Commission's de-
cision, or whether only an applicant may appeal.
137. See Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178
(1950) (Douglas, J. concurring). In Joint Anti-Fascist, the Attorney General, pur-
porting to act under an executive order, designated the three petitioner organi-
zations as communist in a list to be used in the determination of loyalty among
government employees. Id. at 126-29. Neither notice nor hearings were pro-
vided. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Attorney General acted outside the
scope of his authority, and that the petitioners had stated a claim for which relief
could be granted. Id. at 137-42.
138. For a discussion of the substantive due process "taking" issue, see
supra notes 29-58 and accompanying text.
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tice' 3 9 and hearing 140 to which an applicant for a demolition or
alteration permit and other interested parties are entitled. Other
ordinances merely provide that meetings of the historic commis-
sion are open to the public, thus implying that an applicant is en-
titled to a public hearing.' 41
Standards or criteria for granting or denying a permit or cer-
tificate of appropriateness are also important to the constitutional
validity of a historic ordinance. 42 An ordinance which fails to in-
clude or fails to define sufficiently criteria for such decisions may
be found by a court to violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment or to be an invalid delegation of legisla-
tive power.' 43 The requirement of specific standards presents a
"Catch 22" in that a decision regarding aesthetics in design is al-
ways ultimately subjective, and thus difficult to define with speci-
ficity. One safeguard for ordinances which regulate aesthetics,
such as historic ordinances, is to require expertise in the composi-
tion of the reviewing board or commission.1 44 Most of the ordi-
nances reviewed for this Article contain at least some criteria by
which the historic commission can adjudge compliance with the
ordinance.
The Savannah, Georgia ordinance provides a good example
of specific standards for the inherently subjective task of deter-
139. The Baltimore ordinance requires that the property be posted with
notice of the hearing no sooner than ten but no later than twenty days before the
public hearing. BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 1, § 40(g)(5) (1966). The Bos-
ton ordinance requires written notice to abutting landowners as well as posted
notice in the city clerk's office. 1975 Boston, Mass. Acts ch. 772, § 10 (Dec. 16,
1975) (amended 1982). The Charleston ordinance provides written notice to
interested organizations if such organizations prepay postage. CHARLESTON,
S.C., CITY CODE art. 3, § 54-27(b) (1966).
140. See, e.g., PORTLAND, OR., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 33, § 33.120.080(c)
(1975). The Portland ordinance provides that the applicant, a representative of
the Bureau of Buildings, and the Planning Commission all have the right to tes-
tify at the public hearing. Id. The ordinance further requires, if the structure is
located within a designated district, that recommendations be made by the dis-
trict advisory council of the designated district. The Commission retains the
discretion to hear testimony from any interested party. Id.
141. See, e.g., SAVANNAH, GA., HISTORIC DISTRICT ZONING ORDINANCE § 8-
3029(h)(5) (Dec. 1972). This ordinance is silent as to procedures for public
hearings.
142. For a discussion of the necessity for using specific standards when
making land use regulation decisions, see supra notes 22-28 and accompanying
text.
143. For the pertinent text of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, see supra note 29.
144. For a review of the required background for members of historic com-
missions, see supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. See also Maher v. City of
New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1062 (5th Cir. 1975).
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mining appropriate designs for historic structures. 45 It also dif-
ferentiates the standards applicable to buildings based upon their
historic significance. The preservation ordinances of New Orle-
145. SAVANNAH, GA., HISTORIC DISTRICT ZONING ORDINANCE § 8-3029(i)(6)
(Dec. 1972). The ordinance provides as follows:
(6) Visual Compatibility Factors. Within said Zone I, new construction
and existing buildings and structures and appurtenances thereof
which are moved, reconstructed, materially altered, repaired, or
changed in color shall be visually compatible with buildings,
squares, and places to which they are visually related generally in
terms of the following factors:
(a) Height: The height of proposed buildings shall be visually
compatible with adjacent buildings.
(b) Proportion of building's front facade: The relationship of
the width of the building to the height of the front elevation
shall be visually compatible to buildings, squares, and places
to which it is visually related.
(c) Proportion of openings within the facility: The relationship
of the width of the windows to height of windows in a build-
ing shall be visually compatible with buildings, squares, and
places to which the building is visually related.
(d) Rhythm of solids to voids in front facades: The relationship
of solids to voids in the front facade of a building shall be
visually compatible with buildings, squares, and places to
which it is visually related.
(e) Rhythm of buildings on streets: The relationship of the
building to open space between it and adjoining buildings
shall be visually compatible to the buildings, squares, and
places to which it is visually related.
(f) Rhythm of entrance and/or porch projection: The relation-
ship of entrances and porch projection to sidewalks of a
building shall be visually compatible to the buildings,
squares, and places to which it is visually related.
(g) Relationship of materials, texture, and color: The relation-
ship of materials, texture, and color of the facade of a build-
ing shall be visually compatible with the predominant
materials used in the buildings to which it is visually related.
(h) Roof shapes: the roof shape of a building shall be visually
compatible with the buildings to which it is visually related.
(i) Walls of continuity: Appurtenances of a building such as
walls, wrought iron, fences, evergreen landscape masses,
building facades, shall, if necessary, form cohesive walls of
enclosure along a street to ensure visual compatibility of the
building to the buildings, squares, and places to which it is
visually related.
(j) Scale of a building: The size of a building, the building mass
of a building in relation to open spaces, the windows, door
openings, porches, and balconies shall be visually compatible
with the buildings, squares, and places to which it is visually
related.
(k) Directional expression of front elevation: A building shall be
visually compatible with the buildings, squares, and places to
which it is visually related in its directional character, whether
this be vertical character, horizontal character, or nondirec-
tional character.
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ans, Louisiana provide another good approach in that they differ-
entiate criteria based upon the action desired by the
landowner.' 46 Thus, the criteria for a permit to demolish is dif-
ferent from that for a permit to alter or to erect a sign on a his-
toric site.
The ordinances also vary in the magnitude and types of ac-
tions which constitute an "alteration" and that would thus trigger
146. New Orleans, La. Ordinance 5992 § VIII (Feb. 19, 1976) (revised Aug.
21, 1980); 6699 § VIII (Feb. 23, 1978) (revised May 7, 1981). The ordinances
provide:
The commission shall adhere to and seek compatibility of struc-
tures in the district in terms of size, texture, scale, and site plan and in
so doing, the following guidelines shall be considered by the Commis-
sion in passing upon application for a Certificate of Appropriateness:
A. For new construction:
(1) All new construction shall be visibly compatible with the
buildings and environment with which they are related.
(2) The general design, scale, gross volume, arrangement, site
plan, texture, material and exterior architectural features of new
construction shall be in harmony with its surroundings and shall
not impair the 'toute ensemble' of the neighborhood.
(3) No one architectural style shall be imposed.
(4) Quality and excellence in design should be major
determinants.
B. For exterior alterations:
(1) All exterior alterations to a building shall be compatible with
the building itself and other buildings with which it is related, as
provided in A(2) above and in applying these standards, the origi-
nal design of the buildings may be considered.
(2) Exterior alterations shall not affect the architectural character
or historic quality of the building.
C. For signs:
(1) The scale, and design of any sign should be compatible with
the buildings and environment with which it is related.
(2) The materials, style, and patterns used in any sign should be
compatible with the buildings and environment with which it is
related.
D. Demolition:
In considering an application for the demolition of a landmark or a
building in an historic district, the following shall be considered:
(1) The historic or architectural significance of the building.
(2) The importance of the building to the 'toute ensemble' of the
district.
(3) The special character and aesthetic interest that the building
adds to the district.
(4) The difficulty or impossibility of reproducing such a building
because of its design, texture, material, or detail.
(5) The future utilization of the site.
E. Destruction of a non-conforming use:
The reconstruction of buildings legally nonconforming as to use
and destroyed by fire, storms, or other Acts of God shall be governed
by the provisions of the zoning ordinance except that the Commission
shall regulate the exterior design of such buildings.
Id. 5992 § VIII, 6699 § VIII.
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the review process. For example, some ordinances expressly
specify that certain minor repair work is excluded from the ambit
of the ordinance. 147 Under these ordinances, minor work requires
only administrative approval while substantial change to a struc-
ture triggers review by the commission and other agencies. Other
ordinances make no distinction as to degrees of alteration. 48
Most ordinances include only exterior changes within their
purview. 149
F. Duty to Keep Designated Buildings in Repair
Many of the- historic preservation ordinances studied create
an affirmative duty for property owners to maintain in good re-
pair their designated structures or structures located in a desig-
nated district. The purpose of imposing such a duty is to prevent
a landowner from avoiding the preservation of a structure of his-
toric significance by intentionally neglecting its maintenance.
This inaction is commonly termed "demolition by neglect" be-
cause it often results in such dilapidation that the structure is ulti-
mately demolished or an equivalent result is achieved.' 50
The ordinances attempt to resolve the problem of demolition
by neglect in a number of ways. In Annapolis, Maryland and
Boise, Idaho, for example, the ordinances not only affirmatively
require that owners maintain their historic structures, but set
forth exactly which types of maintenance must be performed as
well.' 5 ' Other ordinances include demolition by neglect within
147. See, e.g., DALLAS TEX., CITY CODE § 51-4.501(b)(3)(A) (1981). The
Dallas ordinance provides that the director of planning make a threshold deci-
sion as to whether an application requires a certificate of appropriateness review
by the committee. That review is not required for actions such as water blasting,
stripping, painting, replacing, duplicating or stabilizing deteriorated or dam-
aged architectural features (roofing, windows, columns and siding) Id.; see also
PITrSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 513.5(b)(2) (1985).
148. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 21, § 21-64.1 (1957)
(amended 1968).
149. See, e.g., BOISE, IDAHO, ORDINANCE 4443, ch. 18, § 2-18-9(A) (Sept. 4,
1979).
150. See New Orleans, La. Ordinance 5992, § XVI (Feb. 19, 1976) (revised
Aug. 21, 1980); see also Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm'n, 171 Conn. 198, 368
A.2d 163 (1976); 7 P. ROHAN, supra note 11, at 7-61-64.
151. See, e.g., ANNAPOLIS, MD., CITY CODE art. XI, § 22-231.1 (1969). The
Annapolis provision provides:
(a) Neither the owner of nor the person in charge of a property
within the historic district of the city as described within the boundaries
set forth in section 22-227 shall permit such structure to fall into a state
of disrepair which may result in the deterioration of any exterior appur-
tenance or architectural feature so as to produce or tend to produce, in
the judgment of the city building inspector, after consultation with the
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the statutory definition of "demolition," and thus require a per-
mit application before an owner may fail to maintain the struc-
ture. 152 Obviously, an owner intending to neglect his or her
historic structure to avoid the effect of protective legislation is un-
likely to submit a formal application beforehand. The practical
result of this provision, however, is to subject an owner to the
penalty provisions of the ordinance for failing to apply for the
permit. In Charleston, South Carolina, the Board of Architec-
tural Review may file a petition with the Public Safety and Hous-
ing Officer to require the correction of defects.' 53 In New Oleans,
Louisiana, a property owner may be called before the Historic
Commission if his or her historic property has not been kept in
good repair. 15 4
Each approach is probably sufficient to combat the problem
of demolition by neglect. It may, however, be easier to enforce an
ordinance such as that of Annapolis, which specifically addresses
those components of the structure which must be maintained. 55
G. Penalties
Some ordinances contain penalties for violation of their pro-
visions, while others are silent as to how the ordinance should be
enforced. Most ordinances that contain penalty provisions also
historic district commission, a detrimental effect upon the character of
the district as a whole or the life and character of the structure in ques-
tion, including but not limited to:
(1) The deterioration of exterior walls or other vertical supports;
(2) The deterioration of roofs or other horizontal members;
(3) The deterioration of exterior chimneys;
(4) The deterioration or crumbling of exterior plaster or mortar;
(5) The ineffective waterproofing of exterior walls, roofs and
foundations, including broken windows or doors;
(6) The deterioration of any feature so as to create or permit the
creation of any hazardous or unsafe condition or conditions.
(b) "Demolition" within this article includes any wilful negli-
gence in maintenance and repair of a structure, not including any ap-
purtenances and environmental settings, held or used in a trade or
business or for the production of income, that does not result from
financial inability to maintain and repair the structure and that threat-
ens the result in any substantial deterioration of the exterior features of
the structure.
Id.;see also BOISE, IDAHO, ORDINANCE 4443 ch. 18, § 2-18-15 (Sept. 4, 1979) (sim-
ilar provisions).
152. See, e.g., BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. I, § 4 0(q)(l) (1966); 1975
Boston, Mass. Acts ch. 772, § 2 (Dec. 16, 1975) (amended 1982).
153. CHARLESTON, S.C., CIrY CODE art. 3, § 54-32 (1966) (amended 1973).
154. New Orleans, La., Ordinance 5992, § XII (Feb. 19, 1976) (revised
Aug. 21, 1980).
155. For a discussion of the Annapolis ordinance, see supra note 151.
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authorize their respective historic commissions to bring an action
to enjoin any impermissible conduct, such as the alteration or
demolition of a structure. 56 Presumably, an action could simi-
larly be brought to enjoin an owner's demolition by neglect,
particularly in jurisdictions in which the ordinance defines
"demolition" to include demolition by neglect. Some ordinances
authorize the imposition of fines' 57 and others authorize impris-
onment for noncompliance.15 8
IV. THE NEW PHILADELPHIA HISTORIC
PRESERVATION ORDINANCE
Philadelphia's new historic preservation ordinance changes
Philadelphia's law in this area in a number of ways. Supporters of
the ordinance suggest that two major changes in the law appear in
the new ordinance. 5 9 First, the protective ambit of the new ordi-
nance now extends to historic districts, objects and sites, rather
than merely to historic buildings as it once did.' 60 Second, the
new ordinance directs the Department of Licenses and Inspection
(L&I) to deny a building permit if the Historical Commission ob-
jects to its approval.' 6' The permanent denial of a permit for
demolition or alteration is allowed under the new ordinance, un-
less the permit applicant demonstrates the non-feasibility of
adaptive reuse that the property cannot provide a reasonable eco-
nomic rate of return. 162 The old ordinance had merely author-
ized the delay of demolition for, at most, six months by the
156. See, e.g., 1975 Boston, Mass. Acts ch. 772, § 10 (Dec. 16, 1975)
(amended 1982).
157. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 21, § 21-64.2 (1957)
(amended 1968).
158. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 207-16.0 (1965).
159. Longergan, Bill No. 318: It Saves Buildings, Philadelphia City Paper,
December 7-21, 1984, at 26.
160. Compare PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(4)(a), (b) (1984) (dele-
gates to Historical Commission power to designate historic districts, structures,
sites and objects, as well as historic buildings) with id. § 14-2007(4) (1956) (re-
pealed 1984) (provides that Department of Public Property and Historical Com-
mission classify historic buildings).
161. Id. § 14 -20 0 7 (7 )(g)( 2 ) (1984).
162. Id. § 14-2007(7)(0. Section 2007(7)() provides as follows:
In any instance where there is a claim that a building, structure, site or
object cannot be used for any purpose for which it is or may be reason-
ably adapted, or where a permit application for alteration, or demoli-
tion is based, in whole or in part, on financial hardship, the owner shall
submit, by affidavit ... [financial] information to the Commission.
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Department of Public Property. 63
While these two differences between the new and old ordi-
nances are certainly significant, the new ordinance varies a great
deal from its predecessor in a number of other ways. Undoubt-
edly, the current ordinance adds much in terms of mere length,
and consequently, detail. But some of its additions may also have
a real impact upon the preservation of historic structures in
Philadelphia.
A. The Historical Commission
While the Historical Commission will continue to be the gov-
erning entity for historic preservation, 164 the new ordinance
makes significant changes to the powers and the composition of
the commission. Under the old ordinance, for example, the very
existence of the commission was a matter of discretion for the
Mayor of Philadelphia. 65 The new ordinance requires the Mayor
to appoint a Historical Commission. 166
The composition of the Commission is also changed by the
new ordinance. The Historical Commission must now consist of
the President of City Council or his or her designee, the Director
of Commerce, the Commissioner of Public Property, the Com-
missioner of Licenses and Inspections, the Chairman of the City
Planning Commission or his or her designee, and the Director of
Housing or his or her designee. 67 Mayoral appointees on the
Historical Commission must include a historical preservation ar-
163. Id. § 14-2007(5)(e) (1956) (repealed 1984). That section provided:
If the Department [of Public Property] concludes that the demolition or
alteration should be postponed, it shall, before issuing any final order
with respect to such postponement, afford the applicant an opportunity
to appear before the Commission to offer any evidence he may desire
to present concerning the proposed order. No order issued by the De-
partment postponing a proposed demolition shall be for a period in
excess of six months.
Id. Although this section may be read to mean that demolitions and alterations
may only be postponed, it was interpreted by the Commission as authorizing the
Commission to permanently deny an application for an alteration permit. Tele-
phone interview with Richard Tyler, Philadelphia Historical Preservation Com-
mission (July 21, 1986).
164. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(4) (1984).
165. Id. § 14-2007(3) (1956) (repealed 1984). That section provided:
"The Mayor may appoint a Philadelphia Historical Commission . Id. (em-
phasis added).
166. Id. § 14-2007(3) (1984). The new ordinance provides that "[t]he
Mayor shall appoint a Philadelphia Historical Commission . Id. (emphasis
added).
167. Id.
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chitect, a historian, or architectural historian, a real estate devel-
oper, a community development corporation representative, a
representative of a community organization and two other per-
sons learned in the historic traditions of the city. 168 Under the
old ordinance, the Historic Commission consisted of the Director
of Finance, the Commissioner of Public Property and five persons
interested in preservation and learned in the historic traditions of
the city.' 69 Apparently, the Philadelphia City Council thus
deemed valuable the experience and services of preservationists,
architects and historians to the work of the Commission, and de-
sired an approach to preservation which integrated the work of a
greater range of city administrative agencies. The requirement
that the Commission include professionals associated with his-
toric architecture and design is typical of many modern ordi-
nances.170  It should add both experience and community
perspective to the Commission, which, in turn, should lead to
more knowledgeable decisions regarding designation and the re-
view of demolition and alteration permit applications.
B. Duties of the Historical Commission
The duties of the Historical Commission set forth by the old
ordinance were limited. The Commission was to assist the De-
partment of Public Property in the preparation of an inventory of
buildings of historic significance 17' and advise the department of
its objections to applications for permits for demolition or altera-
tion. 172 The new ordinance grants the Commission a range of
new substantive duties. The Commission is directed to: 1) desig-
nate historic buildings, structures, sites and objects subject to
stated criteria; 173 2) designate and delineate the boundaries of
historic districts; 74 3) prepare and maintain an inventory of his-
toric buildings, structures, sites objects and districts 75 and 4) re-
view applications to alter or demolish designated historic
buildings, structures, sites, objects, and those buildings, struc-
168. Id.
169. Id. § 14-2007(3) (1956) (repealed 1984).
170. For a discussion of the authorization for, and the composition and ap-
pointment of historic preservation commissions, see supra notes 73-80 and ac-
companying text.
171. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(4)(a) (1956) (repealed 1984).
172. Id. § 14-2007(5)(c).
173. Id. § 14-2007(4)(a) (1984).
174. Id. § 14-2007(4)(b).
175. Id. § 14-2007(4)(c).
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tures, sites, and objects located within a historic district.1 76 The
new legislation also delegates to the Commission certain duties
which may be described as discretionary duties. These latter du-
ties include: 1) recommending to the Mayor the allocation of
grants, gifts and the budget for preservation; 177 2) recommending
acquisitions of structures or objects of historic significance; 78
3) increasing public awareness of historic preservation; 179
4) adopting rules, regulations and committees 180 and 5) keeping
records and minutes of all proceedings.' 8'
The new historic preservation ordinance substantially adds to
the duties of the Philadelphia Historical Commission. It is also
among the broadest historic preservation ordinances surveyed
with regard to the duties it delegates to the Philadelphia Histori-
cal Commission. It authorizes the Commission to designate
landmarks and to delineate the boundaries of historic districts.182
The only other historic preservation legislation surveyed which
authorizes a historic commission to designate landmarks or dis-
tricts without legislative approval is that of the District of Colum-
bia.' 83  The ordinance also authorizes a broad range of
discretionary duties to the Commission, which are similar to those
duties delegated in other municipal ordinances. 84
C. Criteria for Designation
The inclusion of criteria for designating historic sites, objects
or districts in the new ordinance is also a major change because
the old ordinance contained no criteria for historic designation.
The inclusion of criteria for designation is important, as it may
176. Id. § 14-2007(4)(d). This section provides that the Historical Commis-
sion will have the power and duty to:
Review and act upon all applications for permits to alter or demolish
historic buildings, structures, sites or objects; to alter or demolish
buildings, structures, sites or objects located within historic districts,
and to review and comment upon all applications for permits to con-
struct buildings, structures or objects within historic districts as pro-
vided in this section.
Id.
177. Id. § 14-2007(4)(e).
178. Id. § 14-2007(4)(f).
179. Id. § 14 -20 0 7 (4)(g).
180. Id. § 14-2007(4)(h).
181. Id. § 14-2007(4)(i).
182. Id. § 14-2007(4)(a)-(b).
183. Washington, D.C. Law 2-144 § 4(c)(3) (Dec. 27, 1978).
184. For a discussion of various powers and duties of historic commissions,
see supra notes 81-109 and accompanying text.
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protect the legislation from constitutional challenges based on
the denial of equal protection or procedural due process which
threaten vague legislation. 8 5
The designation of a building, building complex, structure,
site, object or district is dependent upon its historic integrity. A
property may be designated as historic if it "has significant char-
acter, interest or value as part of the development, heritage or
cultural characteristics of the City, Commonwealth [of Penn-
sylvania] or Nation, or is associated with a person significant in
the past." 186 Designation may also be premised upon association
of the property with an event of historical significance,187 the
property's reflection of the environment of a distinctive architec-
tural style,' 88 or the characteristics of an architectural style or en-
gineering specimen.' 8 9 If the property is the product of a
designer, architect, engineer or landscape architect that influ-
enced the development of the City, Commonwealth or Nation, 190
or contains elements which represent a significant innovation,' 9 '
the Commission may then designate it as historic. Other criteria
include: the relationship of the property to a square, park or dis-
tinctive area;' 9 2 the location or visual features of the property as
related to the neighborhood, community or city;19 3 its yield or
likelihood of yielding historic information 94 and its exemplifica-
tion of the cultural, political, economic, social or historical heri-
tage of the community.' 9 5
D. Procedure for Designation
The old historic preservation ordinance provided no set pro-
cedure for designation. That ordinance directed the Department
of Public Property, with the assistance of the Historical Commis-
sion, to prepare a list of buildings in Philadelphia deemed to be
185. For a discussion of the necessity for specific standards to be employed
by governmental entities making land use regulation decisions, see supra notes
22-28 and accompanying text.
186. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(5)(a) (1984).
187. Id. § 14-2007(5)(b).
188. Id. § 14-2007(5)(c).
189. Id. § 14-2007(5)(d).
190. Id. § 14-2007(5)(e).
191. Id. § 14-2007(5)(f).
192. Id. § 14-200 7 (5)(g).
193. Id. § 14-2007(5)(h).
194. Id. § 14-2007(5)(i).
195. Id. § 14-2007(5)(j).
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historically significant. 196 The old ordinance, however, contained
no procedural safeguards concerning notice or hearings for either
the designation or listing of the property.
No designation of a building, structure, site, object or his-
toric district under the new ordinance may occur without a public
meeting.1 97 Notice of a proposed designation of a building,
structure, site or object must be sent to the owner of the con-
cerned property at both the address of the property and the
owner's last known tax address at least thirty days in advance of
the public meeting.198 For the designation of a historic district,
the owners of each building within the proposed district must re-
ceive the same type of notice of the proposed district designation
sixty days before the public meeting. 199
Any interested individual may submit evidence at the public
meeting, either in testimonial or documentary form. 200 In the
case of the designation of a historic district, the City Planning
Commission must send comments on the proposed district to the
Commission prior to the hearing.20 1
Notice of the decision to designate must be sent to the own-
ers of buildings, structures, sites, objects and the owners of indi-
vidual structures in a proposed historic district. 20 2 Such notice is
also sent to the individuals who appeared and so requested it at
the public meeting. 203 The substance of the notice must contain
the reasons for designation.20 4 As with notice of the public meet-
ing, notice of designation must be sent to the owner's last known
address in the real estate tax records and to the street address of
the designated property. 20 5
196. Id. § 14-2007(4)(a) (1956) (repealed 1984).
197. See id. § 14-2007(6) (1984).
198. Id. § 14-2007(6)(a). Notice must indicate the date, time and place of
the public meeting, and must be sent to the registered owner both at his last
known address as it appears in his real estate tax records, and at his street ad-
dress. Id.
199. Id. § 14-2007(6)(b). The notice must include the date, time and place
of the public meeting, and is to be forwarded to the registered owner's last
known address as it appears on the real estate tax records. The notice must also
be published in a newspaper of general circulation and be posted at locations in
the proposed district. Id.
200. Id. § 14-2007(6)(c).
201. Id. § 14-2007(6)(d).
202. Id. § 14-2007(6)(e). Apparently the ordinance does not require that
notice of a decision by the Commission denying the designation of a particular
property be given to owners or interested parties.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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All designated buildings, structure, sites, objects and districts
are to be recorded in a register, which is to be available for public
inspection at the Historical Commission Office, the Department
of Licenses and Inspections and at the Department of Records. 20 6
Rescission or amendment of a designation takes place under the
same procedure as would designation. 20 7
E. Permits for Demolition or Alteration
Under both the new ordinance and the repealed ordinance,
no designated structure or structure within a historic district may
be demolished or altered without a permit to do so obtained from
L&I. 20 8 The new ordinance, however, gives broader powers to
the city government to deny a permit.20 9
Under the old ordinance, the Department of Public Property
forwarded applications for permits to alter or demolish historic
buildings to the Historical Commission. 210 After consulting with
the Commission, the Department had sixty days to decide
whether to grant the permit or delay demolition. 21' A Depart-
ment order could delay demolition for no longer than six months
under the old ordinance. 212
The new ordinance considerably expands both the permit ap-
plication process and the powers of the Commission to deny a
permit. Perhaps the most important change concerns the six-
month delay of denial of a permit to demolish a designated struc-
ture.213 The new ordinance gives the Commission the power
206. Id. § 14-2007(6)(g).
207. Id. § 14-2007(6)(f).
208. See id. § 14-2007(7)(a) (1984) ("Unless a permit is first obtained from
the Department [of Licenses and Inspections], no person shall alter or demolish
an historic building .... ); Id. § 14-2007(5) (1956) (repealed 1984) ("No preson
shall demolish or alter any building on the list prepared pursuant to this section
unless he has obtained a permit from the Department of Licenses and
Inspections.").
209. Compare id. § 14-200 7 (7)(g)(. 2 ) (1984) ("Where the Commission has
an objection, the Department [of Licenses and Inspections] shall deny the per-
mit.") with id. § 14-2007(5)(e) (1956) (repealed 1984) (when Department of Pub-
lic Property issues final order to postpone alteration or demolition for six months,
applicant may appear before Commission to offer evidence concerning pro-
posed order).
210. Id. § 14-2007(5)(b) (1956) (repealed 1984).
211. Id. § 14-2007(5)(c).
212. Id. For the text and a discussion of the provision of the repealed ordi-
nance which delayed demolition for a six month period, see supra note 163 and
accompanying text.
213. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(7)(h) (1984).
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both to deny permission to demolish or alter2 14 and power merely
to delay demolition or alteration for six months in cases where
postponing such a decision is appropriate. 21 5
There are, however, other differences between the old and
new ordinances and the means by which they treat permit applica-
tions. The new ordinance, for example, requires L&I to post no-
tice of an application for demolition on each street frontage of the
proposed premises within seven days of receipt of the applica-
tion. 216 Similar to the old ordinance, the new legislation requires
review and comment by the Historical Commission within forty-
five days of the application. 21 7 The applicant must file with the
Commission the plans and specifications of the proposed altera-
tion, and in the event of a proposed demolition, the applicant
must include the plans and specificatons of the proposed new
cons truction. 218
Any objections by the Historical Commission to the applica-
tion must be announced within sixty days of receipt of the appli-
cation by the Commission. 21 9 To avoid conflict with the City
Charter regarding advisory committees such as the Historical
Commission, L&I is the entity which actually grants or denies a
permit application. 220 But, under the language of the ordinance,
the objection of the Commission to the permit application has the
effect of requiring L&I to deny the permit. 221 Its approval merely
has the effect of granting the permit subject to the applicant's
compliance with other laws. 222 The Commission may postpone
its decision on a proposed alteration or demolition for up to six
months. 223 It may also grant conditional approval to an applica-
tion and incorporate the conditions into the permit. 224
Unlike its predecessor, the new ordinance sets forth criteria
for the approval or denial of an application for demolition or al-
214. Id. § 14 -20 0 7 (7 )(g)(.2).
215. Id. § 14-2007(h).
216. Id. § 14-2007(7)(b).
217. Id. § 14-2007(7)(c), (d).
218. Id. § 14-2007(7)(e).
219. Id. § 14 -20 0 7 (7 )(g).
220. For a discussion of possible conflicts between the 1984 historic preser-
vation legislation and the Philadelphia City Charter, see infra notes 259-88 and
accompanying text.
221. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14 -200 7 (7 )(g)(.2) (1984).
222. Id. § 14-200 7 (7)(g)(.1).
223. Id. § 14 -20 0 7 (7 )(g)(. 3 ), (h).
224. Id. § 14-2007(7)(i).
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teration of a designated historic structure. 225 The standards in-
clude: 1) compliance with the purposes of the new ordinance,
2) the historic, architectural or aesthetic significance of the struc-
ture, 3) the effect of the proposed work on the surroundings of
the structure, 4) the compatibility of the proposed work with the
surroundings of the structure, 5) the design of the proposed
work, and 6) the compliance of the proposed work with the Stan-
dards for Rehabilitation and Guidelines for Rehabilitating His-
toric Buildings as set forth by the Secretary of the Interior 226 or as
per similar building criteria.
F. Financial Hardship and Non-Feasibility of Adaptive Reuse
Constitutional law has established that a mere dimunition in
the value of regulated property will not establish a taking.2 27 Yet
a government may not deprive a landowner of all value of his land
without complying with the fifth amendment requirement of com-
pensation.2 28 The new ordinance, however, provides more pro-
tection to the landowner than the United States Constitution. It
sets forth a number of bases upon which the Historical Commis-
sion may authorize the issuance of a permit for demolition, even
where the ordinance has not reduced value of land entirely, and
thus where a taking has not occurred under constitutional
jurisprudence. 229
The first basis upon which issuance of a permit may be au-
thorized is if a designated structure or building in a historic dis-
trict "cannot be used for any purpose for which it is or may be
reasonably adapted." 230 The standard as set forth by the ordi-
nance is virtually co-extensive with the test for a taking under
Maher.231 In Maher, the court ruled that Maher failed to show that
a taking occurred by the ordinance leaving his property virtually
valueless. 232 The court wrote:
225. Id. § 14-2007(7)(k).
226. See 36 C.F.R. § 67.7 (1986) (Secretary of the Interior's "Standards for
Rehabilatation").
227. See, e.g., Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm'n, 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d
163 (1976). For a discussion of Figarsky, see supra note 32.
228. For a discussion of the "taking" issue, see supra notes 28-57 and ac-
companying text.
229. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(7) (1984).
230. Id. § 14-2007(7)(j).
231. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of Maher, see supra
notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
232. Maher, 516 F.2d at 1066.
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In particular, Maher did not show that the sale of the
property was impractical, that commercial rental could
not provide a reasonable rate of return, or that other po-
tential use of the property was foreclosed. To the extent
that such is the theory underlying Maher's claim, it fails
for lack of proof.233
The new ordinance uses virtually identical language to require a
showing that a building cannot be used for any purpose for which
it is or may be reasonably adapted. The ordinance provides:
In order to show that a building, structure, site or object
cannot be used for any purpose for which it is or may
be reasonably adapted, the owner must demonstrate that
the sale of the property is impracticable, that commercial
rental cannot provide a reasonable rate of return and
that other potential uses of the property are
foreclosed. 23 4
The second basis upon which the Commission may grant a
permit to demolish a designated structure exemplifies how the or-
dinance protects the landowner beyond the protections of the
fourteenth amendment. The ordinance provides that the Com-
mission may provide an exemption from the requirements of the
ordinance where a literal enforcement of the ordinance would re-
sult in unnecessary hardship 23 5 and where the exemption would
not be contrary to the public interest. 23 6 This provision is very
similar to the standard for variance from a zoning ordinance. 237 It
233. Id.
234. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(7)6) (1984).
235. Id. § 14-2007(7)(c)(.7). The language of the ordinance does not des-
ignate who must suffer the unnecessary hardship: the owner or the applicant.
236. Id. § 14-2007(7)(k)(.7).
237. The constitutional limitations on the granting of a zoning variance
were discussed in National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Bd.
of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). In National Land, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court stated:
[A]n application for a variance implies a challenge to the legality of the
zoning ordinance as it applies to a specific piece of property. Zoning is
permitted when exercised for the promotion of the health, safety,
morals or general welfare of the community. Such exercise of the po-
lice power, however, may ... impose upon the owner of ... properties
an 'undue hardship.' When so applied, the ordinance can not be
termed a reasonable or constitutional exercise of the power. To pre-
serve the validity of the zoning ordinance ... the variance provision of
the enabling act functions as an 'escape valve' so that . . . a means of
relief from the mandates of the ordinance is provided.
Id. at 511-12, 215 A.2d at 602 (citations omitted).
438 [Vol. 32: p. 401
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss2/2
HISTORIC PRESERVATION LEGISLATION
allows the Commission more flexibility and affords the landowner
greater protection from the application of the historic preserva-
tion ordinance.
Finally, the Commission may grant a permit to demolish a
designated historic structure if it finds that "issuance of the per-
mit is necessary in the public interest." 238 This is a very broad
grant of discretion by the legislature to the Historical Commis-
sion. There are no guidelines as to what the public interest might
be in a given circumstance. This final basis is a large loophole in
the ordinance which could conceivably allow very important his-
toric structures to be demolished based on a factual finding by an
agency which would probably be difficult to reverse on appeal.
If a property owner desires to assert one of these three bases
for permit approval, he or she must submit detailed financial in-
formation to the Historical Commission. 23 9 The Commission
may also require that further feasibility studies be conducted at
the owner's expense. 240
G. The Duty to Maintain Designated Buildings and Perform
Adaptation and Repairs with
Historic Integrity
Another major substantive addition to the new historic pres-
ervation ordinance is the requirement that repairs or alterations
to historic structures conform to the style of the era in which the
construction took place24 1 and that designated structures be kept
in good repair.242 The repealed ordinance had no provision of
any nature for overseeing maintenance or alterations.
The new ordinance directs that upon request from the His-
torical Commission, L&I will examine the physical condition of
any designated structure. 243 L&I also has the duty under the or-
238. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(7)(j) (1984).
239. Id. § 14-2007(7)(). The information which must be provided to the
Commission includes: 1) the amount paid for the property, 2) the date of
purchase, 3) the seller, and the seller's relationship to the buyer, 4) the assessed
value of the land and improvements, 5) annual gross income from the property,
6) itemized operating and maintenance expenses, 7) real estate taxes, 8) annual
debt service, 9) annual cash flow, 10) deductions and depreciation from federal
income taxes, 11) all appraisals of the property, 12) all listings for sale or rent,
price asked, and offers received and 13) any considerations for profitable adap-
tive reuses. Id.
240. Id. § 14-2007(7)()(7).
241. Id. § 14-2007(7)(k).
242. Id. § 14-2007(8)(c).
243. Id. § 14-2007(8)(a).
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dinance to inspect structures for which alteration permits have
been granted to ascertain whether the alterations are being per-
formed in accord with the conditions or requirements of the per-
mit. 244 The ordinance authorizes L&I to issue a stop work order
if the alterations fail to conform with the permit. 245
The new ordinance further places an affirmative duty upon
owners of designated structures or structures within a designated
district to maintain the exterior of the structure. 246 Compliance
with the duty to repair is policed by the Commission, which may
request that L&I inspect property and report on its condition. 247
The purpose of this provision is to prevent "demolition by ne-
glect" of historic property.2 48 However, acts of ordinary mainte-
nance or repair, where the purpose of the repair is to prevent
deterioration, are excluded from the provisions of the ordinance
which require that a permit be obtained before any work is per-
formed, 249 and thus might be construed as prohibiting the
repair. 250
Legislative provisions which place an affirmative duty of
maintenance upon an owner appear in the strongest historic pres-
ervation ordinances. It was prudent for the drafters of the ordi-
nance to designate a department of city government responsible
for reviewing compliance with permits and with the affirmative
obligation to maintain property.
H. Enforcement of the Ordinance and Appeals
The new historic preservation ordinance gives certain powers
of enforcement to L&I. The old ordinance was silent with regard
to the enforcement of its provisions. On the other hand, the old
ordinance contained no affirmative requirement for maintenance
of designated buildings, and it gave L&I little more than the
power to postpone demolitions for six months. Arguably, there
were few prohibitions under the old ordinance which would need
to be enforced.
The new ordinance authorizes L&I to adopt regulations for
244. Id. § 14-2007(8)(b).
245. Id.
246. Id. § 14-2007(8)(c).
247. Id. § 14-2007(8)(a).
248. For a definition of the term "demolition by neglect," see supra text
accompanying note 150.
249. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(7)(a) (1984).
250. Id. § 14-2007(8)(d).
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the enforcement of the ordinance. 251 In the event that L&I un-
covers a violation, it may issue an order to comply, which is
served on the owners of the designated property. 252 The ordi-
nance authorizes a fine of three hundred dollars or imprisonment
for up to ninety days for its violation. 253 The ordinance also di-
rects that a person who alters or demolishes a designated struc-
ture must restore the structure to its pre-violation condition. 25 4
The new ordinance sets forth a procedure for appeal by an
aggrieved party of any decision of the Historical Commission re-
garding the issuance or denial of a permit.255 Perhaps it was un-
necessary that the old ordinance include such a procedure, since a
property owner could merely wait out the six month postpone-
ment of the permit denial.2 56 In any event, the new ordinance
contains such a provision where the old ordinance is silent.
An aggrieved person may appeal the action of the Historical
Commission to the Board of License and Inspection Review
within fifteen days of notice of the Commission's decision. 257 The
Review Board must then give notice to the Commission of the
appeal within three days of the filing of the appeal. 258 Presuma-
bly, after exhaustion of administrative remedies, an aggrieved
party may seek judicial review. 259
V. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF THE NEW PHILADELPHIA
HISTORIC PRESERVATION ORDINANCE
The newly enacted Historic Preservation Ordinance for the
City of Philadelphia represents a substantial change in the law
since its predecessor of 1955. The new legislation reflects the
evolution of constitutional jurisprudence in land use law, as well
as, the experiences of many communities in enacting and enforc-
ing historic preservation legislation. It undoubtedly falls into the
category of ordinances which grant more power and discretion to
historic commissions to carry out their prescribed functions.
251. Id. § 14-2007(9)(a).
252. Id. § 14-2007(9)(b).
253. Id. § 14-2007(9)(c).
254. Id. § 14-2007(9)(d).
255. Id. § 14-2007(10).
256. For a discussion of this aspect of the old ordinance, see supra notes
162 & 211 and accompanying text.
257. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(10) (1984).
258. Id.
259. See PHILADELPHIA, PA., HOME RULE CHARTER art. v, § 5-1005 (1951);
see, e.g., H. A. Steen Indus., Inc. v. Cavanaugh, 430 Pa. 10, 241 A.2d 771 (1968).
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There are, however, some problems with the new ordinance.
The problems may be categorized as: 1) the conflict between the
Historical Commission's responsibilities under the ordinance and
the Philadelphia City Charter, 2) appellate review by the Board of
Review of Licenses and Inspections, and 3) the effect of the ordi-
nance upon the Philadelphia Historic Preservation Corporation's
Facade Easement Program.
A. Conflict with the Philadelphia City Charter
Under the repealed historic preservation ordinance, the
existence of the Historical Commission was a matter of discretion
for the Mayor. 260 The new legislation mandates that the Mayor
appoint a Historical Commission. 26' While that change is benefi-
cial in terms of promoting preservation activities in Philadelphia,
it is not entirely clear that the change complies with the Philadel-
phia Home Rule Charter. 262
The Charter only authorizes certain enumerated administra-
tive agencies. 263 The Charter provides that executive and admin-
istrative powers shall be vested in "a Mayor and such other
officers, departments, boards and commissions as are designated
and authorized in this Charter." 264 The Charter, therefore, antici-
pates that there will be no additional administrative agencies
other than those authorized therein. The Charter does allow for
the establishment of "such additional advisory boards as the
mayor may permit." 265 Section 3-971 of the Charter provides
that "[t]he Mayor may upon request of the head of any depart-
ment or of his own volition appoint a board of seven citizens to
act in an advisory capacity to such department regarding the de-
partment's work or any specified phase of it."266 The Charter
does not include and express authorization for the Philadelphia
Historical Commission as an administrative agency. Thus, its sole
basis for existence would be as an advisory board, which, under
the Charter, may have only advisory powers.
260. Id. § 14-2007(3) (1956) (repealed 1984). For the text of this provi-
sion, see supra note 165.
261. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(3) (1984). For the text of this
provision, see supra note 166.
262. PHILADELPHIA, PA., HOME RULE CHARTER (1951).
263. Id. art. I, § 1-102(l).
264. Id.
265. Id. § 3-100(h).
266. Id. § 3-917. It should be noted that, under the 1984 historic preserva-
tion ordinance, the Philadelphia Historical Commission includes at least seven
citizens in its membership. See PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14.2007(3) (1984).
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If the Philadelphia Historical Commission is merely an advi-
sory board because the Charter does not expressly provide for its
existence, the question is then whether the ordinance has dele-
gated more than advisory powers to the Commission. The ordi-
nance does delegate certain duties to the Commission which are
clearly advisory, such as recommending the uses of grants 26 7 and
purchases of historic structures. 268 Certain other duties dele-
gated by the ordinance, such as increasing public awareness 269 or
preparing an inventory of historic structures, 2 70 may not be
strictly "advisory," but few people would likely claim that these
innocuous duties constitute an improper delegation of power.
On the other hand, the duties of designating historic struc-
tures,271 delineating and designating historic districts, 272 and re-
viewing all applications for permits to alter or demolish historic
structures2 73 are powers which clearly are not "advisory." The
ordinance attempts to avoid conflict with the Charter while giving
the Commission the authority to determine the outcome of per-
mit applications. It does so by authorizing only L&I the power to
grant or deny permit applications. 274 At the same time, it re-
quires that L&I deny any permit application to which the Com-
267. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(4)(e) (1984).
268. Id. § 14-2007(4)(f).
269. Id. § 14 -20 0 7 (4 )(g).
270. Id. § 14-2007(4)(c).
271. Id. § 14-2007(4)(a).
272. Id. § 14-2007(4)(b).
273. Id. § 14-2007(4)(d).
274. Id. § 14 -20 0 7 (7 )(g). Subsection (7)(g) provides:
(g) Within sixty (60) days after receipt by the Commission of a permit
application, the Commission shall determine whether or not it has any
objection to the proposed alteration or demolition.
(.1) where the Commission has no objection, the Department
shall grant the permit subject to the requirements of any applicable
provisions of the code and regulations and subject to any conditions of
the Commission pursuant to the subsection (7)(i).
(.2) where the Commission has an objection, the Department
shall deny the permit.
(.3) where the Commission acts to postpone the proposed altera-
tion or demolition pursuant to subsection (7)(h) of this Section, the
Department shall defer action on the permit application pending a final
determination by the Commission approving or disapproving the appli-
cation. Before taking any action, the Commission shall afford the
owner an opportunity to appear before the Commission to offer any
evidence the owner desires to present concerning the proposed altera-
tion or demolition. The Commission shall inform the owner in writing
of the reasons for its action.
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mission has an objection. 275 Effectively, therefore, the ordinance
gives the Commission the power to deny permit applications.
The ordinance makes no attempt to reconcile the conflict
with the Charter regarding the designation of historic structures
and districts. Quite simply, the Commission itself may designate
properties as historic.276 In other communities, legislative ratifi-
cation or some other legislative action is required before a prop-
erty may be so designated.2 77 Indeed, the old ordinance
mandated designation by the Department of Public Property
"with the aid of the historic commission," thus eliminating any
potential conflict with the Charter.2 78
There is one case in Pennsylvania which deals with advisory
boards under Philadelphia's Home Rule Charter. In Harrington v.
Tate,2 7 9 plaintiffs were successful in convincing a chancellor that
the Philadelphia Police Advisory Board was improperly estab-
lished. 280 The Police Advisory Board was established to investi-
gate citizen complaints regarding police personnel. 281 The Board
conducted hearings at which rules of evidence were followed, and
made recommendations to the Police Commissioner, who could
either take or refrain from taking action. 2 2 On appeal, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court reversed. 283 In its analysis, the court
commented:
An advisory board, while it may go about its tasks in
much the same manner [as a review board], is not statu-
torily charged with governmental functions and its deci-
sions are not judicial. Those decisions are merely
recommendations which the receiver thereof is free to
275. Id.
276. Id. § 14-2007(4)(a)-(b).
277. For a discussion of ordinances requiring legislative ratification or ac-
tion prior to property designation, see supra notes 112-29 and accompanying
text.
278. See PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007 (1956) (repealed 1984).
279. 435 Pa. 176, 254 A.2d 622 (1969).
280. Id. at 178, 254 A.2d at 624. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
that "[i]n considering that the Board was improperly established, the chancellor
strayed far from the legal issue." Id.
281. Id. The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter provided the statutory au-
thorization for the creation of the Board. See PHILADELPHIA, PA., HOME RULE
CHARTER art. III, ch. 1, § 3-100(h) (1951); id. ch. 9, § 3-917.
The court found that the Charter provisions gave the mayor the authority
"to appoint a board to advise the police department on community relations and
police discipline." 435 Pa. at 178-79, 254 A.2d at 624.
282. 435 Pa. at 179, 254 A.2d at 624.
283. Id. at 181, 254 A.2d at 625.
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ignore .... [T]he Police Advisory Board has always rec-
ognized this essential difference in that it made recom-
mendations which the Police Commissioner was free to
accept or ignore in disciplining the city policemen.2
8 4
Under the Harrington rationale, the processes used by the Histori-
cal Commission to designate and to review permit applications
would be found inappropriate, because in both cases no other
governmental entity is free to reject the Historical Commission's
decision.
A strong argument can be made under the Home Rule Char-
ter that the creation of the Historical Commission was valid. The
Home Rule Charter provides:
Any additional executive and administrative power
which may be conferred on the City by amendment of
the Constitution or by the laws of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania shall be vested in and exercised by the
Mayor and, as far as practicable, by the officers, depart-
ments, boards and commissions designated in this char-
ter. The Council shall by ordinance distribute among
such officers, departments, boards and commissions
such new powers and duties, but to the extent that this is
not practicable, it may create additional offices, boards and
commissions for the exercise of such powers and the
performance of such duties .... 285
This provision anticipates the creation of new commissions when
additional powers or duties for the city are created by constitu-
tional amendment or legislation.
Since the Charter was enacted, the Pennsylvania Constitution
has recognized the right to environmental protection 286 and the
284. Id. at 179, 254 A.2d at 624.
285. PHILADELPHIA, PA., HOME RULE CHARTER art. I, § 1-102(2) (1951) (em-
phasis added).
286. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (1971). Section 27 provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preser-
vation of the natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the envi-
ronment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common
property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Id.; see also Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa.
Commw. 231, 302 A.2d 886, aff'd, 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973) (enjoining
construction of observation tower on historic site pursuant to PA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 27).
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Pennsylvania legislature has promulgated enabling legislation for
historic district ordinances.2 87 Arguably, the enabling legislation
for historic districts creates no powers or duties for Philadelphia,
because the act refers only to second class cities. 288 The Penn-
sylvania constitutional amendment, however, refers to the preser-
vation of historic values as a right of the commonwealth's
citizens. 2 9 Thus, there exists a constitutional expression of pub-
lic concern regarding historic preservation which did not exist at
the time that the Home Rule Charter was enacted.
Arguably, it would be difficult for an advisory board to effec-
tively implement policies developed at the state constitutional
level; thus, the Charter authorizes the Commission's creation.
B. Review by the Board of License and Inspection
There has also been concern about the appeal provisions of
the new historic preservation ordinance. This appeal provision
provides:
Any person aggrieved by the issuance or denial of
any permit reviewed by the Commission may appeal
such action to the Board of License and Inspection Re-
view. Such appeal must be filed within fifteen (15) days
of the date of receipt of notification of the Commission's
action. The Board of License and Inspection Review
shall give written notice of any such appeal to the Com-
mission within three (3) days of the filing of the
appeal. 290
The first problem with the appeal provision is with who may
appeal a decision of the Historical Commission. The ordinance
allows "any person aggrieved" by the decision to appeal. 291 That
category would most certainly include a property owner who was
denied a permit. Moreover, because the section permits an ap-
peal of the issuance of a permit, 292 it implies that at least an adja-
287. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 8001-8006 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1986).
288. Id. § 8002. The provision for creating and defining districts states that
"all counties, cities, except cities of thefirst class, boroughs, incorporated towns and
townships, are hereby authorized to create and define, by ordinance, a historic
district or districts .... " Id. (emphasis added).
289. For the text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision, see supra
note 85.
290. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(10) (1984).
29 1. See id.
292. See id.
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cent property owner would be an aggrieved person. Perhaps
even a Philadelphia citizen's group could have standing to com-
plain of a commission decision. 293 Obviously, the ordinance
would be clearer if it defined who is an aggrieved person.
There has also been concern that the Board of License and
Inspection Review is composed of citizens less experienced in
preservation matters than the members of the Historical Commis-
sion.294 The ordinance lends no guidance as to what scope of
review the Board of License and Inspection Review is to employ
on appeal. On the one hand, review could have been intended to
be de novo, to avoid any allegations that the Historical Commis-
sion had powers beyond that of an advisory board. On the other
hand, review could be construed to be parallel with that pre-
scribed by law for review by courts of local agency adjudica-
tions.295 The applicable Act provides for review of whether the
finding was supported by sufficient evidence where the record was
complete. 296 In any event, several questions remain to be an-
swered with regard to appeals under the new legislation.
C. Facade Easements and the New Ordinance
There has been some criticism that the ordinance will ad-
versely affect the Philadelphia Facade Easement Program of the
293. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). But see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
294. For a discussion of the composition and manner of appointment of the
Commission, see supra note 164-70 and accompanying text.
295. The Pennsylvania statute provides for judicial review of local agency
adjudications:
Disposition of Appeal
(a) Incomplete record.-In the event a full and complete record
of the proceedings before the local agency was not made, the court may
hear the appeal de novo, or may remand the proceedings to the agency
for the purpose of making a full and complete record or for further
disposition in accordance with the order of the court.
(b) Complete record.-In the event a full and complete record of
the proceedings before the local agency was made, the court shall hear
the appeal without a jury on the record certified by the agency. After
hearing the court shall affirm the adjudication unless it shall find that
the adjudication is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appel-
lant, or is not in accordance with law, or that the provisions of Sub-
chapter B of Chapter 5 (relating to practice and procedure of local
agencies) have been violated in the proceedings before the agency, or
that any finding of fact made by the agency and necessary to support its
adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence. If the adjudica-
tion is not affirmed, the court may enter any order authorized by 42 Pa.
C.S. § 706 (relating to disposition of appeals).
2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 754(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987).
296. Id.
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Philadelphia Historic Preservation Corporation (PHPC). The
Facade Easement Program permits a property owner to donate a
legal interest in the facade of a historic building to PHPC.297 The
facade easement "imposes restrictions upon modifications to one
or more of the facades of a building [that part of a building that
can be seen by a person facing it] and imposes requirements for
their proper maintenance and repair." 298 Because the easement
is granted in perpetuity, 299 subsequent purchasers of the property
purchase subject to the easement, and will thus be required to
maintain the facade accordingly.
The incentives for a property owner to donate a facade ease-
ment include potential income, gift, estate and property tax bene-
fits.3 0 0 The tax benefits inure from the reduction in value of a
structure resulting from the restrictions of the easement. 30'
One criticism of the new historic preservation ordinance has
been its potential adverse effect on the Facade Easement Pro-
gram. Many of the structures which would be eligible for the
Facade Easement Program might also qualify for designation
under the ordinance. The ordinance imposes the affirmative obli-
gation of maintenance upon the owner of a designated structure.
Thus, the restriction contained in the easement might only reiter-
ate those restrictions to which a property owner is already sub-
jected under the ordinance. The easement then may lose the
effect of reducing the value of the property and, consequently, the
tax benefits of donating a facade easement would be minimized.
Of course, the PHPC easement generally contains restric-
tions beyond the affirmative obligation of keeping the exterior of
a structure in "good repair," as is required by the ordinance.30 2
The easement may dictate detailed requirements such as the color
of paint or frequency of painting. Restrictions beyond the obliga-
tion to keep an exterior in "good repair" may have the effect of
reducing the value of a property, even if the reduction is less than
297. See generally Historic Preservation, PA. BAR INST. 326-31 (1984). The arti-
cle describes the transfer of a facade easement to be "in the form of a deed
granted in perpetuity to Philadelphia Historic Preservation Corporation, which
specifies the level of restoration to which the building is to be restored and
maintained and provides for monitoring and enforcement." Id. at 326.
298. Id.
299. See supra note 297.
300. Historic Preservation, PA. BAR INST. 326, 328 (1984).
301. Id. at 328.
302. The 1984 ordinance requires only that "[t]he exterior of every historic
building, structure and object located within an historic district shall be kept in
good repair." PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007(8)(c) (1984).
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it would have been absent the obligations of repair under the
ordinance.
This criticism only applies to structures which are both desig-
nated under the ordinance and enrolled in the Facade Easement
Program. The benefits of the program are still available to struc-
tures not governed by the ordinance. Few easements on proper-
ties certified as Philadelphia landmarks have been donated to
PHPC since the new ordinance was enacted. Thus, it is impossi-
ble to assess the actual value of the decline in easement dona-
tions. 303 Appraisals indicate a reduction of approximately two
points in the value of a non-income producing facade easement
donation. While the ordinance may reduce the value of the dona-
tion to the taxpayer, it has not eliminated the charitable contribu-
tion for easement donations. PHPC expects a slight decline in
value for designated historic properties. 30 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The new ordinance for the preservation of historic structures
in the City of Philadelphia was long overdue. The prior ordi-
nance was inadequate in that the only enforcement mechanism
for the Historical Commission was the power to delay the demoli-
tion of an historic structure. It is also possible that the old ordi-
nance was constitutionally infirm for its lack of standards for both
designation and the process to review permit applications.
The new ordinance is sound in comparison with both its leg-
islative predecessor and with historic preservation legislation in
other communities. However, the ordinance is not without flaws.
The new ordinance may conflict with the Philadelphia Home Rule
Charter. Its process for appeals is ambiguous in terms of stand-
ing on appeal and the scope of administrative review. In addition,
the ordinance may weaken other preservation tools, such as the
Facade Easement Program. Of course, the ordinance can always
303. Letter from Donna A. Harris, Director of Preservation Programs for
Philadelphia Historic Preservation Corporation, to Charlotte E. Thomas (No-
vember 13, 1986) (discussing appraisal of Philadelphia's certified easements and
the problems resulting from over-valuation penalties for appraisers).
304. Id. A more significant problem with the Facade Easement Program is
the lack of suitable appraisers who are willing to risk over-valuation penalities
which can be assessed against the appraiser. Id. One of these penalties pre-
cludes the appraiser from giving credible testimony before the Internal Revenue
Service. Id. These penalties have resulted in a scarcity of appraisers willing to
value easements. Id.
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be changed by amendment.A0 5 Nevertheless, the ordinance is a
welcome addition to the historic preservation program in the City
of Philadelphia.
305. See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2007 (proposed amendment,
Bill No. 1006, introduced June 26, 1986).
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